The Net Zero Game

Share of 2020 private-car demand still served by a liquid-fuelled car in 2050. The four car shares are rebalanced to 100% as the player moves them.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 10% is the French teaching workbook's horizon share for gas-fuelled cars. Germany's compressed-natural-gas fleet is small and shrinking — the tax advantage runs out in 2026 — so the German figure is probably lower, not higher. It cannot be moved from here alone. The four car shares must sum to 100% at their defaults and only this one is national, so changing it needs carFuel, carElectric and carRail marked national as well, and the simpleElectricCars coarse control re-pointed with them. What would close it: a German 2045 passenger-car scenario with a fuel split — the UBA RESCUE or the Langfristszenarien.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, carGas — carried unchanged — Not a German source. See NOTES.md under Placeholders.

Car demand transferred to short-distance rail, at the occupancy and unit consumption of the rail row rather than the car row.

In 2050 the model leaves no fossil liquid fuel at all: every litre is either biofuel or e-fuel made from electricity. This is a scenario assumption, and it is why liquid fuel carries a low emission factor.

The headline decarbonisation choice for buildings, and the one that drives the winter peak. It is a share of heat need, not of energy: how that heat is produced is the next question down.

A target in the unit the resource constraint is written in. Germany burns about 90 TWh of wood in buildings today — 69.9 TWh in dwellings and 20.4 TWh in service buildings, JRC-IDEES-2021 for 2021 — against roughly 75 TWh in France, so the German slider starts from a larger stock and runs further. The default of 60 TWh is a rule, not a measurement: it is a modest reduction on today, which is what the ENSPRESO forestry potential and the shrinking German forest sink together argue for. The maximum of 150 TWh is above the low-mobilisation German forestry potential (110 TWh in 2050) on purpose, so a player can see the scoreboard band go red rather than be prevented from crossing it.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Residential and Tertiary modules, 2021 — RES_hh_fec, Space heating / Biomass 2021 = 6 010.41 ktoe = 69.9 TWh. SER_hh_fec, Space heating / Biomass 2021 = 1 755.95 ktoe = 20.4 TWh. Extracted by extract/extract_buildings.py.

Seasonal COP 2.5, falling to 2.0 at peak.

Seasonal COP 3.0, falling to 2.0 at peak.

A slider rather than a stock that can only shrink, because a scenario may genuinely install more electric convectors — they are cheap to fit and terrible for the peak. Efficiency 1 in both seasons, so this is the one electric option that buys no COP at all.

Wood in German heat networks. The observed level is 10.7 TWh of fuel input in 2021, derived in extract/extract_district_heat.py from the Eurostat transformation-input balances with the CHP fuel split by energy allocation. The default doubles it, which is a rule: the Wärmeplanungsgesetz requires every network to be fed from renewables or unavoidable waste heat by 2045 and does not say from which.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, EnergyBalance module, sheets TI_EHG_H_E, TI_EHG_CHP_E, TO_EHG_CHP — Heat-only plants plus 43.9 % of the CHP fuel — the heat share of CHP output in 2021 — gives 173.6 TWh of fuel to derived heat, of which 10.7 TWh is wood.

Recovered heat, waste incineration and geothermal in German networks. This lever matters far more in Germany than in France and its French default of 0 would be wrong: Germany already puts about 24 TWh of non-renewable and renewable municipal waste, geothermal and recovered heat into its networks, against a French network a third of the size. The default is set at that observed level; the maximum is a rule.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, EnergyBalance module, sheets TI_EHG_H_E and TI_EHG_CHP_E, 2021 — The `other` vector of the derived-heat fuel input — non-renewable and renewable municipal waste, geothermal, solar thermal, ambient heat and electricity — is 23.6 TWh of the 173.6 TWh total.

One slider conflates retrofit depth and retrofit rate, which have very different costs. Separating them is a documented next step.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

Hidden and inert: this edition carries no cement intensity per square metre, so no floor area can reach its cement. Zero rather than the observed rate, because a number that moves nothing would invite a reader to quote it.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

Hidden and inert, for the same reason as newHousing.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

Hidden and inert: with no floor area reaching cement, a timber share has nothing to displace.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

Hidden and inert: this edition's cement is all in the residual row, which no lever drives, so there is no civil-works tonnage for this index to multiply.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

German ammonia production in 2020, read off the UBA production line of a published Agora Industrie figure to about ±50 kt. Germany makes roughly three times France's 900 kt, at four sites: SKW Piesteritz, BASF Ludwigshafen, INEOS Köln and Yara Brunsbüttel. The maximum is raised from the French 1 400 to 4 000 kt so the slider spans a German range. One thing a German player should be told and a French one need not be: this industry is in the middle of a gas-price shock, and German output fell to about 2 Mt in 2022. Retired here since the land module arrived, and hidden. The ammonia the chain builds hydrogen for is now derived — the mineral nitrogen the German fields receive, times the share made in Germany, divided by the nitrogen fraction of ammonia, plus what the chemical industry makes for something else — so this slider moves nothing in this edition. It stays declared because the British and Spanish editions read it, and a test asserts that it is inert. The derived base-year tonnage lands on the 2 950 kt above by construction, because ammonia_non_fertiliser is the residual of it.

• Agora Industrie, 'Standorte, Produktion und Kapazitäten der Ammoniaksynthese in Deutschland', Abbildung 12 — Read as an image, not as a table. The 'Produktionsvolumen UBA' series runs from about 3 450 kt in 2013 to about 2 950 kt in 2020. The primary behind the chart is the UBA National Inventory Report and the EU Transaction Log, neither of which was opened.

Only the biogenic fraction of the CO₂ fed to the synthetic-olefin route counts as a removal, which is why this lever alone can turn the olefin process term negative.

How much less plastic the country asks for, against the base year — a demand reduction and not a recycling rate. It scales the olefin tonnage the crackers make and, since 0.28.0, the plastic the country's incinerators burn — which is where most of its effect now lies, and why it finally lowers emissions rather than raising them. It is the one lever in this chain that answers "how much of this do we need" rather than "how do we make it". The two French reference scenarios cannot anchor it. ADEME's Transition(s) 2050 publishes material-demand trajectories for steel, aluminium, cement and glass and none for plastics; its plastics content is an 80% recycling rate, and négaWatt does the same. Both express plastics as a rate of recycling, which since 0.33.0 is read on plasticRecycling, not here. What can is SYSTEMIQ's ReShaping Plastics, the one published pathway that separates the wedges. European plastic demand grows in its baseline, 37 to 48 Mt by 2050; its Circularity scenario takes 25% off that baseline by reducing demand and 4% more by substituting materials. Against 2050 that is 29%; against today it is under 10%, because a quarter of a growing baseline is a tenth of the present. This slider is written against the base year, so the two readings are the two ends of what one study supports — and the reference, 30%, sits at the far edge of the more generous one. The sectors move in opposite directions underneath: packaging can lose 38% (an eighth eliminated, a further three tenths reused), vehicles 22%, while construction plastic grows by half in every scenario published. A single national share hides that, and a player moving this slider is assuming the packaging wedge does all the work.

• SYSTEMIQ (2022), ReShaping Plastics: Pathways to a Circular, Climate Neutral Plastics System in Europe, for Plastics Europe — EU27+UK, baseline 37→48 Mt by 2050; Circularity scenario 25% reduce + 4% substitute
• ADEME, Transition(s) 2050 — material-demand trajectories for steel, aluminium, cement and glass; plastics carried as a recycling rate
• See docs/waste/olefins_and_plastic_demand.md for the legal instruments (PPWR, SUP, loi AGEC, décret 3R) and why they do not bound this slider

The share of the plastic that reaches the incinerators in the base year which is sorted out and recycled instead. It is how the French reference scenarios express plastics: ADEME's Transition(s) 2050 and négaWatt both carry an 80% recycling rate, against 20% for all French plastic waste in 2022. If what is not recycled is burned, going from 20% to 80% leaves a quarter of today's burned plastic, which is 75 on this slider; the default, 0, is today's rate. Applied after plasticReduction: plastic not consumed is not there to recycle. Each tonne recycled costs 0.5 MWh of electricity, the middle of the 0.3–0.7 the JRC gives for mechanical recycling, booked on the waste-to-energy post because the model has no post for sorting and recycling. Three things it does not do. The recycled polymer does not displace any virgin olefin: the territorial inventory credits nothing unless French crackers actually make less, and the JRC discounts most recycled polymers to 0.6 of a virgin tonne. Sorting losses are not modelled — a recycling line rejects part of what it receives, and that refuse is burned or landfilled. And the plastic still in the residual bin is the hardest to recover: films, soiled and multilayer packaging, and the plastic in textiles and nappies.

• SDES (September 2025), Bilan 2022 de la production de déchets en France, p. 4 — plastics recycling rate 20%
• ADEME, Transition(s) 2050 — plastics carried as an 80% recycling rate
• JRC (2023), Environmental and economic assessment of plastic waste recycling, EUR 31423, p. 54 — mechanical recycling 0.3–0.7 MWh of electricity a tonne; pp. 29–30, substitution factors (PP 0.6, HIPS 0.65, food-grade PET 1)
• See docs/waste/plastics_and_incineration.md, §2.2

The share of an incinerator's stack CO₂ that is captured and stored. A capture plant does not sort the molecules, so it takes the fossil and the biogenic CO₂ together — and about 60% of what leaves a French incinerator is biogenic. Capturing on an incinerator is therefore mostly bioenergy with carbon capture, which is the point worth teaching. Only the fossil part lowers the national total here. The biogenic part is shown and not counted: a captured biogenic tonne is a removal, and removals are what techSink already stands for — counting them here as well would book the same tonne twice. The hydrogen route does count its biogenic capture as negative, and the controversy table says why that is contested. 90% is the top because it is what the plants being built claim: 85% in the techno-economic literature, 87% at Oslo's Klemetsrud, 90% announced at Le Mans. Since 0.32.0 the capture is powered and paid for: 0.315 MWh of electricity a tonne captured, fossil or biogenic, which the mix has to produce, and 100 € a tonne for the plant plus 50 for transport and storage, in the cost tab. The biogenic tonnes are paid for and not counted, which is why a fossil tonne avoided here costs two and a half times a tonne captured.

• Bertone et al. (2024), Techno-Economic Assessment of Amine-Based Carbon Capture in Waste-to-Energy Incineration Plant Retrofit, Sustainability 16(19) 8468 — 85% capture, 90–156 €/tCO₂
• Hafslund Celsio, Klemetsrud (Oslo) — about 400 ktCO₂/y emitted, 350 kt/y captured, about 60% biogenic; FID January 2025, operation Q3 2029
• See docs/waste/plastics_and_incineration.md, §4

Renamed in v0.20, because it finally has a driver. Until then it was "cement-demand reduction" with no why, no help and nothing behind it: a scenario could take 60% off the country's cement without saying which building it had not built, and the annex could not say what the slider meant. How much is built is now the construction module's business. What is left here is the intensity of the works: leaner mixes, thinner slabs and post-tensioned structures, a design that uses the concrete it pours. It is not clinkerRate, which replaces clinker inside the cement with slag or fly ash; this one asks for less cement in the first place. The two multiply, and a scenario that pushes both is asking for a lot from the same building twice over. The range is a rule. The published levers for the sector are the clinker ratio and capture, and nobody has assessed how far structural design alone can go — so 60% is a bound on an argument rather than on an assessment.

Germany's observed clinker-to-cement ratio: 25 069 kt of clinker for 34 185 kt of cement in 2019 gives 0.733. The 2021 pair — 25 736 kt for 35 000 kt — gives 0.735, so the figure is stable. The French default of 60 % is a scenario choice; putting Germany's default at its own observed ratio means the German reference scenario starts where German kilns actually are, and the whole range of the lever is then the reduction on offer. The maximum of 78 % is not changed: German practice already sits just under it.

• Andrew, R. M. (2026), Global CO2 emissions from cement production, Zenodo, file '2. annual_clinker_production.csv' — Column DEU, thousand tonnes of clinker: 2019 25 069.1 · 2021 25 736.3 · 2024 18 549.0.
• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Industry module, sheet NMM, 'Physical output (kt) / Cement (kt)' — 34 185.3 kt of cement in 2019. VDZ gives 35.0 Mt for 2021.

The share of a cement kiln's fossil stack that is captured: the decarbonation of the limestone and, since 0.29.0, the fossil part of the kiln fuel, because a capture plant on a cement stack does not sort the molecules. The biogenic CO₂ of the waste the kiln burns goes up the same stack and would be captured too; it is not credited, for the reason wteCapture gives. Until 0.27.0 the term this lever multiplied carried the kiln fuel under the name of calcination, and the same fuel was also charged through the energy account — emitted twice, captured once. In 0.27.0 it captured the calcination alone and was a floor; now it is the whole fossil stack. Since 0.32.0 it is powered and paid for: 0.54 MWh of electricity a tonne of clinker at 95%, which the mix has to produce, the capture plant's capital in the cost of clinker, and 50 € a tonne for transport and storage on everything it stores, biogenic included.

The share of a kiln's heat that comes from waste rather than from petroleum coke and coal. French kilns were at 38% in 2015, 44% in 2021 and 52% in 2023, burning over a million tonnes of waste a year; the sector's roadmap takes it to 80% in 2030 and 85% in 2050, the default. About half of that waste is biomass, so the lever cuts the kiln's fossil CO₂ roughly half as fast as it moves: at 0% the whole heat is fossil, at 85% still 56% of it is. It does not take waste from the incinerators, and since 0.33.0 that is a finding rather than a gap. The refuse-derived fuel French kilns burn is made from the refuse of sorting lines — commercial waste, separate collection, bulky waste — and French policy keeps residual household waste out of it. Its alternative is landfill, not the incinerators, which are full and turned away half a million tonnes in 2022. The two would compete for the same tonne only once landfill is close to zero.

• Feuille de route de décarbonation de la filière Ciment (May 2023), Tableau 3-2 p. 12 — 38% (2015), 44% (2021), 80% (2030), 85% (2050)
• France Ciment / SFIC, Le ciment en chiffres 2024, pp. 8 and 10 — 52% of the kiln's energy from waste in 2023, over 1 086 000 t
• ADEME / In Extenso, ELCIMAÏ, RDC (January 2026), DAE et CSR — état des lieux et vision prospective, synthèse, pp. 27, 30, 39 — CSR made from sorting refuse, residual household waste excluded; its alternative outlet is landfill
• ADEME / Rudologia, Le traitement des DMA en 2022 (ITOM 2022), p. 21 — 496 kt turned away by incinerators, 63% of it to landfill

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

How much the branches the game does not model produce, between today's output and the source workbook's 2050 scenario. That scenario is a reindustrialisation: measured branch by branch it multiplies textile output by 8.5, electronics by 3.1, mineral extraction by 2.5, while mineral chemistry falls to 0.52 and naval and aerospace to 0.56. Growth of that size is not decarbonisation, and separating it from the process lever is the whole point — otherwise a player could appear to clean up industry while assuming an eightfold textile sector.

• Offre_et_demande.xlsx, branch sheets E18–E38 — production 2019 and 2050 by product and process
• INSEE, enquête EACEI 2019, for the observed energy consumption by branch

Less of everything the rest of industry makes, branch by branch in the same proportion — metals, minerals, chemistry, paper and the rest — with its fuel, its electricity and its process emissions going down together. Added in 0.30 after students found that the rest of industry could only grow: otherIndustryVolume runs from today's output towards a reindustrialisation, and nothing ran the other way, although these branches carry two thirds of the methane a scenario cannot otherwise get rid of. The top of the range is the one French pathway that contracts industry: ADEME's Génération frugale cuts industrial production by 38% by 2050, because people buy fewer, longer-lived goods. Provisional, because that figure is read from summaries of the study rather than from its industry chapter. And one thing this lever cannot tell apart: a scenario in which France buys less, and one in which France makes less and imports the rest. The territorial account cannot tell them apart either; the first is sufficiency, the second is leakage.

• ADEME (2021), Transition(s) 2050, scenario S1 Génération frugale — industrial production −38% by 2050, as reported in summaries of the study

How much energy each unit of output takes, between today's processes and the 2050 ones. This is where electrification lives: at constant output it takes the electricity of these branches from 68 to 138 TWh while cutting coal and fuel oil to zero. The default is 100% and the volume default is 0%, so the reference scenario reads "the rest of industry modernises at today's output" — the neutral reading, with growth added explicitly.

• Offre_et_demande.xlsx, branch sheets E18–E38 — unit consumption in MWh per tonne, 2019 and 2050

Heat rejected by industrial processes and recovered instead of vented. ADEME puts the recoverable gisement at 15.6 TWh on the 2019 industry, of which 7.7 TWh above 100 °C, and — this is what makes it a real constraint — expresses it against the fuel each sector burns. So the gisement is not a fixed reserve: it shrinks as processes electrify, because there is no combustion left to reject heat from. Recovering waste heat and electrifying heat compete for the same physics, and the model makes them compete.

• ADEME, La chaleur fatale (2017 study, 2021 update)

Cross-cutting energy efficiency — motors, drives, compressed air, insulation, heat integration. RTE, after CEREN, identifies a potential of 21.1% on industrial electricity and 19.8% on fuels, of which about 58% pays back in under three years. The ceiling is branch-specific and applied as such: 11.4% for steel, 15.5% for metals and machinery, 19.3% for paper, 24.1% for minerals, 25.0% for the food industry, 31.1% for chemistry. This lever says how much of that identified potential is actually captured, not how much exists — so it cannot invent efficiency beyond what the study found, which is the point of a ceiling.

• RTE, Bilan prévisionnel — groupe de travail Consommation, after CEREN

The single most consequential German departure from the French file, and it is a decision rather than a lookup. France declares 25 gCO₂/kWh, which encodes "all 2050 methane is biomethane". In Germany that assumption is indefensible as a default: German gas demand is around 864 TWh today, German biomethane production was 12.3 TWh in 2025 plus 1.5 TWh imported — about 1.6 % — and dena puts the exploitable domestic potential from waste and residues above 50 TWh against a 2045 demand case of 200 TWh. Taking dena's own two numbers, the biogenic share of German 2045 methane is about 50/200 = 25 %, and 0.25 × 25 + 0.75 × 227 = 176 gCO₂/kWh, rounded onto the slider's step at 175. A player who thinks Germany will import synthetic or biogenic methane instead can move the slider down; that is the argument the lever exists to have, and starting it at the French 25 would settle it silently.

• Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, WD 8 - 3000 - 055/26, 'Biomassepotenziale für die Biomethanerzeugung' (6 July 2026) — p.4: 256 plants produced 12.3 TWh of biomethane in 2025, 1.5 TWh imported, together about 1.6 % of German natural-gas demand. p.6, citing dena (2026): gas demand ~864 TWh; exploitable national residue potential above 50 TWh; 2045 biomethane demand case 200 TWh.
• Fossil natural gas at 227 gCO₂/kWh is the technology file's own ef_gas_2020 — The blend is arithmetic on two published German quantities, not a German scenario result.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 25 gCO₂/kWh is the French assumption that horizon-year liquid fuel is biofuel or e-fuel. No German life-cycle factor for a 2045 liquid-fuel mix was secured. What would close it: the UBA/DBFZ life-cycle factors behind the German THG-Quote (38. BImSchV), which publish a per-pathway factor for every biofuel and e-fuel route, weighted by the pathway mix a German 2045 scenario assumes. Unlike efGas, this one is not obviously wrong for Germany — German liquid demand in 2045 is small in every published pathway — but it is not German either.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, efLiquid — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 27 gCO₂/kWh is the fossil energy of the French wood chain. It is not a biogenic zero and it is not transferable without checking: Germany imports a larger share of its pellets, and haulage is most of this factor. What would close it: the UBA ProBas life-cycle database entries for Holzpellets and Scheitholz, or the DEPV's own chain analysis.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, efWood — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

Kerosene per passenger-kilometre, improving each year through aircraft renewal, seat density and load factor. Published trajectories converge tightly on 1%/year: ICAO 1.0, ADEME 1.0, T&E 0.9, the UK Committee on Climate Change 0.9, the World Economic Forum's Clean Skies for Tomorrow 1.0, against 2.5 in the more optimistic ICSA figure. The default is 0 because the source workbook uses today's consumption for 2050 — moving the slider to 1 shows what a quarter-century of fleet renewal is worth, and it is worth less than most people expect.

• ICAO, Environmental trends in aviation to 2050 (2019)
• ADEME, Élaboration de scénarios de transition écologique du secteur aérien
• Transport & Environment, Roadmap to decarbonising European aviation (2018)

Passenger-kilometres, compounded over thirty years. The source workbook carries 2020 demand straight through to 2050, which is a growth assumption of zero and a very strong one — no published trajectory says that. For flights departing France the DGAC roadmap gives 1.62%/year falling to 1.19, or 1.8 without a price effect and 0.8 with one; ADEME spans −1.3 to +3.0 depending on scenario and price effect; Eurocontrol gives 3.3 then 1.7. World figures are higher still: ICAO 1.1 to 3.4, Airbus 2.6, Boeing 5.6 falling to 2.5. At 1.5%/year over thirty years traffic grows by 56%, which is worth more than every efficiency gain in the sector combined.

• DGAC, feuille de route de décarbonation de l'aviation
• ADEME, Élaboration de scénarios de transition écologique du secteur aérien
• ICAO environmental trends to 2050; EASA; Eurocontrol; Airbus and Boeing market outlooks

Sustainable aviation fuel from biomass. The published estimates disagree by a factor of six, and which route is assumed matters as much as who estimated it: HEFA from waste oils 600–1 900 €/t, biomass-to-liquid 1 400–2 900, alcohol-to-jet 750–3 900. The default sits mid-range across the three. The width of that range is the honest answer, which is why this is a slider and the range is printed beside it.

• EASA, State of the EU SAF market; European Commission ReFuelEU impact assessment
• ISAE-Supaero, Cost estimation of the use of low-carbon fuels in prospective aviation
• ATAG Waypoint 2050; IEA Advanced Biofuels; Solakivi et al. (2022); O. Massol et al. (2025); DGAC decarbonisation roadmap

Synthetic kerosene from electrolytic hydrogen and captured CO₂. Estimates range from 1 820 €/t (European Commission) to 10 000 (DGAC), with the review's central band at 3 700–6 200. Direct air capture costs more than biogenic CO₂: EASA gives 7 300–8 700 €/t for atmospheric CO₂ against 6 600–7 975 for biogenic.

• EASA and European Commission ReFuelEU Aviation impact assessment
• ISAE-Supaero; ATAG Waypoint 2050; E-Cube; Brynolf et al. (2020); Solakivi et al. (2022); O. Massol et al. (2025)

Everything that is not fuel — aircraft, crew, airport charges, maintenance, overheads — is assumed unchanged in 2050 and is derived from today's ticket through this share. It is the weakest link in the ticket calculation: a 2050 airline may well have a different cost structure, and nothing here models that.

• EASA, European Aviation Environmental Report 2025
• European Commission, study supporting the ReFuelEU Aviation impact assessment (19–33%)

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

Position on the German agriculture pathway: 0 keeps the 2024 inventory value of 60.85 MtCO₂e, 100 reaches the UBA 2026 projection for 2045. Read it as an assumption about the rest of the economy, not as a result — and note that for Germany the endpoint is a projection with existing measures, not a target, because the Klimaschutzgesetz has had no sector targets since the 2024 amendment.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt (14 March 2026) — Read directly, section 3.5 Landwirtschaft. See DE.official.yaml for the 2045 arithmetic.

Same convention: 0 keeps the 2024 value of 5.28 MtCO₂e, 100 reaches the 2045 projection. Germany's waste sector has already fallen by 87 % since 1990 — the 2005 ban on landfilling untreated organic waste is the single most effective instrument in the German inventory — so this pathway moves very little either way.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.6 — Tabelle 6: projection 4.0 MtCO₂e in 2030, continuing to fall to 2050 and beyond.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

The German land account is a net source, and the slider has to run through zero. The lever is a signed magnitude of absorption: positive absorbs, negative emits. German LULUCF was +36.5 MtCO₂e in 1990, +57.8 in 2024 and +26.9 in the 2025 proxy — a net source in every year of the series, which is what the negative minimum is for. The bounds are the German argument in one line. −60 is worse than any year yet observed and is where a continued forest die-back leads; +40 is exactly what KSG §3a requires by 2045, as a four-year average. The default of 0 is a rule and it is a deliberately modest one: it says the German land account stops emitting and absorbs nothing. The UBA's own 2026 projection with existing measures lands at +26 MtCO₂e of emissions in 2045 — a lever position of −26 — which is 66 MtCO₂e away from the law. Retired here since the land module arrived, and hidden. The German natural sink is now computed — seven land classes, six inventory pools, a forest identity in cubic metres and 1.95 Mha of drained organic soil — so this slider moves nothing in this edition. It stays declared because land_module_active reads it and because the British and Spanish editions still use it as their whole land-use model, and a test asserts that it is inert. Everything above is what it said while it was the model.

• Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz §3a — Landnutzung, Landnutzungsänderung und Forstwirtschaft — At least -25 MtCO₂e in 2030, -35 in 2040 and -40 in 2045, as a four-year average ending in the target year.
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen für die deutsche Berichterstattung atmosphärischer Emissionen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, row '4. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry' — Read with extract/extract_uba.py: 1990 +36.495 · 2020 +47.646 · 2023 +73.271 · 2024 +57.839 MtCO₂e. The 2025 proxy +26.855 is in the KSG-sector workbook, sheet THG row 48.

Germany has no statutory removal volume, so there is no closure residual to compute the way France's -43 MtCO₂e is computed. What exists is a projection: the UBA's 2026 Projektionsbericht has 0.7 MtCO₂e captured in 2030, 4.7 in 2040 and 6.2 in 2045 under existing measures, which is where the default of 6 comes from. The minimum is 0 rather than France's 5, because a German pathway with no engineered removal at all is the current legal position, not an extreme.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.2 (Industrie) — 'im Jahr 2030 0,7 Mio. t CO2-Äq., im Jahr 2040 4,7 Mio. t CO2-Äq. und im Jahr 2045 6,2 Mio. t CO2-Äq. abgeschieden'.

Flagged above 20 MtCO₂e/y absorbed. Twenty megatonnes a year, for Germany alone, is around half of everything the planet currently captures and stores, across every facility in operation. The UBA's own projection reaches 6.2 by 2045, and the CO₂ storage law that would allow the rest onshore was only reopened in 2025. Nothing in this model builds the plant, supplies the electricity the capture consumes, or pays for either.

The default is the federal target, not the observed rate. The Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie sets land take below 30 hectares a day by 2030 and a Flächenkreislaufwirtschaft — net zero — by 2050; 30 ha/day is 10.95 kha a year, which rounds to the slider's 11. What Germany actually did in 2024 is 19.2 kha, or 50 ha a day (34 for settlement, 17 for transport, less 1 given back), down from 53 in 2023 and 77 in 2010. The base-year constant carries the 19.2 and this lever carries the target, which is the same arrangement France has between its observed 52 kha/y and its ZAN trajectory. The maximum of 30 kha/y is a rule: it is roughly half again the observed rate, far enough above it for a player to make the artificial pool worse and not so far as to empty a class.

• Destatis, Statistischer Bericht Flächenerhebung nach Art der tatsächlichen Nutzung 2023 and 2024 (33111), sheet 33111-01, row Deutschland — Siedlung + Verkehr 5 207 377 ha at 31.12.2023 and 5 226 558 ha at 31.12.2024: +19 181 ha in the year, which is the 19.2 kha/y the base-year constant carries.
• Destatis, Anstieg der Siedlungs- und Verkehrsfläche — daily indicator — 2024: 34 + 17 − 1 = 50 ha/day; 2023: 53; 2010: 77.
• Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie — 'unter 30 ha pro Tag bis 2030', net zero land take by 2050 — 30 ha/day = 10.95 kha/y, the default of this slider.

The observed net rate, because Germany has no afforestation target to put here. The land survey measures Wald growing 10 688 592 → 10 694 619 ha between 2023 and 2024, +6.0 kha. The forest inventory measures the gross flows behind it over its own decade: 82 kha of new forest (8.2 kha a year, out of Dauergrünland 37, quarries and dumps 12, arable 11 and wet land 11) against 66 kha lost, a net +15 kha over ten years, or 1.5 kha a year. The two disagree by a factor of four on the net figure and the survey's is used, because the survey is the account this module is written in. The maximum of 30 kha/y is a rule and is stated as one: WEHAM holds the German forest area constant over its whole 2023–2062 projection, and UBA's own forest scenarios add set-aside rather than area, so nothing published says how much afforestation Germany could do. What would close it: a quantified target in the Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher Klimaschutz.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 — Waldland: new forest, forest loss and where each came from — 82 kha gained and 66 kha lost over the 2012–2022 inventory period; 16 kha of the loss went to industry, commerce and transport.
• Destatis, Flächenerhebung 2023 and 2024 (33111), Vegetation/Wald — 10 688 592 ha → 10 694 619 ha, +6 027 ha in one year.

Germany's grassland has been growing, so the default is negative. Dauergrünland went from 4 654.7 kha in 2010 to 4 714.3 kha in 2024, +4.3 kha a year, and the reason is the EU greening rules: ploughing permanent grassland has needed authorisation since 2015 and is refused where the regional stock has fallen. In this module's sign convention — positive ploughs grass into crops — that is −4.3 kha/y, and the slider's default is −4. The bounds are a rule. Germany lost roughly a third of a million hectares of grassland between 1991 and 2010, which is where a positive maximum of +50 kha/y comes from, but that series was not fetched and is recorded as unverified. −50 is its mirror.

• Destatis, Dauergrünland nach Art der Nutzung — 2010 to 2024 — 4 654.7 kha in 2010, 4 714.3 kha in 2024, 4 735.7 kha in 2025.

The default is zero because Germany has no soil-carbon target, and the potential behind the slider is the weakest number in this block. The soil inventory of German farmland finds no significant change of topsoil carbon under unchanged management and a loss on dry arable sites, and no German equivalent of the study that sizes the French potential was read. The two potentials this lever is a share of are therefore the French ones per hectare, applied to the German arable and grassland areas, and they are declared provisional with that said in full. A player who moves this slider is moving a French coefficient, and the annex says so.

• Thünen Report 64, Landwirtschaftlich genutzte Böden in Deutschland — Ergebnisse der Bodenzustandserhebung, p. 8 — No significant change of topsoil carbon under unchanged management; a loss on dry arable sites.

Declared in the unit the German statistic publishes — Erntefestmeter ohne Rinde — and converted to standing-stock volume inside the identity by forest_harvest_volume_factor = 1.25. This is the one place the German package needed an equation the French one did not: the Bundeswaldinventur measures increment and mortality in Vorratsfestmeter Derbholz mit Rinde, and the Holzeinschlagsstatistik reports the harvest in Efm o.R., and the two differ by a quarter. Reading the lever in Efm keeps it comparable with what Germany publishes and keeps the 2.14 MWh per cubic metre of the wood supply on the right unit. The default of 76 is the base year rounded to the slider's step: Destatis counted 61.183 Mm³ in 2024, and Thünen's own back-calculation finds the official statistic captures about 81 % of the real harvest, so 75.6 Mm³ is what left the forest. The maximum of 88 is WEHAM's roundwood potential at the start of its 2023–2062 projection; the minimum of 40 is a rule.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024; press releases PD25_144_41 and PD26_134_41 — 2024, 1 000 m³ Efm o.R.: total 61 183, of which Stammholz 33 253, Industrieholz 12 233, Energieholz 12 548 and nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149. Calamity wood 27.3 Mm³.
• Thünen, Einschlagsrückrechnung (Jochem, Weimar, Dieter 2025) — the official statistic captures about 81 % of the harvest — Quoted at search level; the page and the PDF returned HTTP 429 and the figure is recorded as not verified.
• WEHAM 2023–2062 base scenario (Thünen / BMLEH brochure) — roundwood potential 88 Mm³/y at the start, 80.6 Mm³/y over forty years

Sawlogs over the whole harvest: 33.253 of 75.6 Mm³, 44.0 %. On the official harvest alone it reads 54.3 %, and the two are quoted for different arguments — the informal firewood is a third of the difference between them. Germany's share is twice France's because the German forest is half spruce and pine and the German sawmilling industry is three times the size. The bounds are a rule around it: 30 % is roughly the share at the bottom of the calamity years, when everything went to the chipper, and 55 % is a little above the share of the official harvest, which is as far as a strategy could push it without changing the species mix.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag 2024 — Stammholz 33 253 of 61 183 thousand m³ Efm o.R.

The largest lever on German land, and its default is zero because no German target for it could be verified. 1.945 Mha of drained organic soil emit about 52 MtCO₂e a year — 8 % of the national total, and more than the whole German cement, steel and chemical industry's process emissions together. Rewetting is the measure every German LULUCF scenario turns on, and this slider is the share of that area put back under water by 2045. Zero is a deliberate reading of the evidence rather than a placeholder: the Nationale Moorschutzstrategie's PDF is a dead link, the Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher Klimaschutz's rewetting volume is quoted only in secondary pages, and the UBA's own 2026 projection says the 2030 LULUCF target "ist nicht mehr erreichbar" and that 2040 and 2045 are missed with current measures. A reference that rewetted nothing is what current measures describe. A player who moves this slider to 100 finds about 44 MtCO₂e a year, which is what the argument is about. The step of 5 % is 97 kha of rewetting per notch, which is the right order of magnitude for a programme: German rewetting has run at a few thousand hectares a year.

• UBA, Emissionen der Landnutzung, Landnutzungsänderung und Forstwirtschaft — peat soils — 52.2 MtCO₂e from peat soils in 2024, about 8 % of the national total, of which 43.0 Mt on agricultural cropland and grassland including the nitrous oxide booked in sector 3.D.
• Thünen, Aktualisierte Kulisse organischer Böden — 1.93 Mha (1.87 without deeply covered peat)
• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, p. 31 — The 2030 LULUCF target is no longer reachable and the 2040 and 2045 targets are missed with existing measures.
• DEHSt, Natürlicher Klimaschutz — Moore — Drained arable peat quoted at about 40 tCO₂e/ha/y and forest or unused peat above 20. A federal rewetting target in hectares was not found on a primary page, which is why this slider's default is 0 rather than a strategy position.

Germany has no published climate grid for its forest, so this one is assembled from three sources and declared provisional. France reads the IGN–FCBA's own C1/C2/C3; nothing equivalent exists here. Position 1 is WEHAM's base scenario, the only official projection, which holds the area constant and the stock near 3.6 Gm³. Position 2 continues what the last inventory decade measured: gross increment fell 16 % between the 2002–2012 and the 2012–2022 periods and mortality rose by half. Position 3 is bounded by the source case of the Projektionsbericht forest modelling, which puts 2045 living biomass anywhere between −31.8 and +10.6 MtCO₂e. The default is 1 and that is the optimistic end, deliberately. A reference should stand on the country's own official projection, and WEHAM is the only one Germany has; at position 1 the land account lands at a source of 56 MtCO₂e in 2045 against 58 observed in 2024, which is what "with existing measures" ought to look like. What was actually measured is position 2 — the German forest was a net carbon source over 2017–2022, losing 41.5 Mt of carbon from its living trees — and one click to the right costs 26 MtCO₂e a year. A player should make that click. France's default is its central case rather than its official one, because the French official projection is itself a climate grid; Germany's is not.

• UBA Climate Change 26/2026, Klimasensitive Waldmodellierung, p. 14 — CARESupreme reaches about −30 MtCO₂e/y under favourable climate and a net source under unfavourable climate; averaged rather than annual climate series overstate the sink by 13–14 Mt/y. Rock et al. 2025 put 2045 living biomass between −31.8 and +10.6 MtCO₂e.
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 — increment 101.5 Mm³/y (−16 % on 2002–2012), departures 110.1 Mm³/y (+4 %), calamities 49 % of them

The 2024 supply balance, rounded to the slider's step: pork 35.5, beef and veal 11.8, sheep and goat 0.70 kilograms of carcass weight a head, 48.1 in all. Carcass weight is Verbrauch and not Verzehr: what reaches a German plate is 38.2 kg, and the difference is bone, fat and the losses the food-waste lever moves separately. The bounds are the published scenario range. The Oeko-Institut's Klimaschutzszenarien for the federal economics ministry cut meat 30 % by 2045, which is 34 kg; the dietary society's own rule of thumb — meat and sausage, "weniger ist mehr", widely quoted as 300 g a week — is about 21 kg of edible weight and lands near the slider's minimum of 15 on a carcass basis. 55 is a little above today, because a scenario is allowed to go the other way.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024 — Verbrauch per head 2024, kg: pork 35.5, beef and veal 11.8, poultry 20.9, sheep and goat 0.70, all meat 73.0. Verzehr: 28.2, 9.5, 13.7, 0.56, 53.5. Population denominator 83.51 M at 30.06.2024.
• Oeko-Institut for BMWK, Klimaschutzszenarien 2050 — Sektor Landwirtschaft — KS1/KS4 cut livestock 37 % against 2020 by 2045, milk 40 % and meat 30 %; KS3 cuts 44 %.

20.9 kg of carcass weight a head in 2024, 13.7 as edible weight. Germany is the one large European producer whose poultry self-sufficiency is below one — 98 % — so a diet that shifts from red meat to poultry buys part of its chicken abroad, which the import share of the animal_product table carries. Bounds as for red meat: the scenario range, widened a little upwards.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024 — poultry 1 741.4 kt consumed, 1 704.8 produced, 20.9 kg/head

An index rather than a quantity, because milk equivalents are published on several incompatible bases. 100 % is 2024: 33.8 Mt of cow milk produced, 46.1 kg of drinking milk, about 26 kg of cheese, 5.6 kg of butter and 6.4 kg of dried products a head. The minimum of 50 is below the Klimaschutzszenarien's own −40 % on milk by 2045, so the published scenario is inside the slider rather than at its end.

• BLE, Bericht Milch 2026 — Cow-milk production 34.0 Mt in 2025 and 33.8 Mt in 2024; 93.1 % delivered to dairies. Per head 2024: drinking milk 46.1 kg, butter 5.6, dried 6.4, fresh milk products 79.1.

Zero is today, because the German target is a halving by 2030 that the country is not on track for and the reference is what existing measures deliver. Germany threw away 10.8 Mt of food along the whole chain in 2022 and 10.9 Mt in 2023; households are 58 % of it, 74.5 kg a head, down from 78 kg in 2020. The maximum of 50 % is the UN target Germany signed, applied to the edible share the module carries.

• BMLEH, Lebensmittelabfaelle in Deutschland — 10.8 Mt in 2022, households 6.3 Mt = 58 % = 74.5 kg per head.
• UBA, Lebensmittelabfaelle — 10.9 Mt reported for 2023.

An index on the base-year volumes, held at 100 because no German scenario publishes a 2045 trade position. It matters more here than in France: German pork self-sufficiency is 135 %, all meat 119 %, and the export volume is what keeps the herd from falling with the diet. The Thuenen-Baseline projects meat production −11 % and milk deliveries +3 % by 2034 with the trade position roughly held, which is inside this slider rather than at its end.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024 — exports and self-sufficiency by product — Self-sufficiency 2024: pork 135 %, beef 106 %, poultry 98 %, sheep 44.5 %, all meat 119 %.
• Thuenen Report 117, Thuenen-Baseline 2024-2034, Table 3.2 — 2034 against 2020-22: cattle −12 %, pigs −15 %, poultry +5 %; milk deliveries +3 %, meat −11 %; sector greenhouse gases −7 %.

Held at the base year for the same reason as the livestock export: nothing published gives a German 2045 crop trade position. Germany is a net importer of grain in most years and a net exporter in good ones, which is why the export share of the arable area is smaller here than in France. The bounds are the French rule, 0 to 150 % of the base-year volume.

Held at the base year, and that is a statement rather than a default. Germany has no published 2045 nitrogen figure the way France has the SNBC 3's −54 %: the Duengeverordnung caps application against crop need and tightens it in nitrate-vulnerable areas, and the deliveries have already fallen — 1.03 Mt N in 2023/24 against 1.14 in 2024/25, 67.8 kg N a hectare of farmland — but no target says where they land. The German reference therefore cuts nitrogen only through the organic share, which is the one national number there is, and the fall in the herd. Since stage E this lever is the dose on the hectares that stay conventional: with organicShare at the Bio-Strategie's 30 % the reference delivers about 74 % of the 2023 nitrogen, and the two effects are counted once rather than twice.

• IVA, Der Duengemittelmarkt 2024/2025 — 1.137 Mt N in 2024/25, +3.8 % on 1.095 in 2023/24 on the association's own perimeter; 67.8 kg N per hectare of farmland.
• DRV, Erneuter Rueckgang beim Handelsduenger-Absatz — 1.03 Mt N sold in 2023/24

The observed area rounded to the slider's step: 285.0 kha of pulses and 387.4 kha of forage legumes in 2024, 672 kha in all, and rising — 326 and 401 kha in 2026. The maximum of 2.0 Mha is a rule at three times today, the same multiple the French slider carries, and it is well inside the German arable area. The nitrogen credit this lever earns is the weakest coefficient in the German food block: no German study of the mineral nitrogen a legume rotation replaces was read, so legume_n_credit and legume_credit_span carry the French pair on the German area and say so.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten — 2024: Huelsenfruechte 285.0 kha, Leguminosen zur Ganzpflanzenernte and Futterleguminosen 387.4 kha.

The one German agricultural target with a number on it, and the module makes it harder than it is. The Bio-Strategie 2030 sets 30 % of farmland organic by 2030. This lever is the organic share of the arable area, and organic farming in Germany is over-represented on grassland — 994 042 ha of organic grassland against 866 249 ha of organic arable in 2026, so 11.3 % of arable plus grassland but only 7.4 % of arable land. Reading the target as 30 % of arable land is therefore a more demanding scenario than the strategy asks for, and it is the reading the module uses because both effects it carries — no mineral nitrogen, a yield gap — live on arable land. That choice is what puts the German reference short of arable land, which the Land and food tab reports and does not clamp.

• Destatis, Oekologischer Landbau — Ackerland und Dauergruenland — 2026: 1 860 291 ha in all, arable 866 249 and grassland 994 042 — 11.3 % of arable plus grassland, 7.4 % of arable land.
• BMLEH, Bio-Strategie 2030 — 30 % Oekolandbau

Zero, because nothing in the German inventory or in German policy books a feed additive. The Klimaschutzszenarien assume an additive reaching half the cattle herd by 2045, which is where the middle of this slider sits, and the effect per animal it earns — enteric_lipid_effect — is carried as a provisional 0.2 with no German measurement behind it. A player who moves this slider is betting on a technology, and the annex says so.

• Oeko-Institut for BMWK, Klimaschutzszenarien 2050 — Sektor Landwirtschaft, p. 22 — A methane-reducing feed additive at 50 % penetration in the cattle herd.

The default is today's level, not zero, and that is a departure from the French edition worth stating. Germany already digests 8.1 of the 15.3 Mt of technically collectable manure dry matter — 53 % on the energy basis the biogas equation reads. Setting the slider at 0 the way France does would have made the German reference produce 15 TWh less manure biogas than Germany produces today, which is a sixth of the biogas band. The cost of that choice is booked openly: the module applies methanisation_abatement to a base year that is already net of today's digestion, so the reference under-books manure methane by about 1.2 MtCO2e, 2 % of the sector. The fix is an equation change — the abatement should act on the digestion added to the base year — and it would move France, so it is recorded in NOTES.md rather than made here.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3) — Manure dry matter, Mt: technical 15.3, used energetically 8.1. Cattle slurry 8.24 technical / 4.93 used, cattle solid 5.91 / 1.84, pig slurry 1.00 / 0.61, pig solid 0.18 / 0.09, poultry 0.63 / 0.63.
• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Tables 230, 232 and 263 — Digestion avoids 42.5 kt of methane, 15.8 % of the manure methane that would otherwise be released, with 18.8 % of the manure nitrogen digested. The nitrogen basis and the dry-matter basis are different fractions of the same practice, which is why each constant states which one it is on.

Zero, because the UBA projection with existing measures does not take fossil fuel off the German farm and this reference is that projection. The KSG's own 2045 target — net greenhouse-gas neutrality — requires the whole 7.5 MtCO2e to go, and that is the far end of this slider rather than its default. The gap between the two is one of the reasons the German reference is amber on the agriculture band.

• UBA, Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet Daten Sektor Landwirtschaft — 1.A.4.c farm and forestry energy is 7.5 MtCO2e in 2024 and is inside the KSG agriculture sector.

A labelled placeholder. The share of German mineral nitrogen made in Germany is not published in the sources this port read. The fertiliser industry association says German supply has relied heavily on imports since the 2022 gas-price shock without giving a tonnage, and German ammonia output itself fell to about 2 Mt in that year from 2.95 Mt in 2020. Half is a reading of those two statements and nothing more. It is not inert: the tonnage it produces is what the industry chain builds hydrogen for, so a reviewer should treat the German ammonia electricity and hydrogen figures as carrying this uncertainty. What would close it: the Destatis production statistics for GP 20151030 and the IVA import shares by nutrient.

• IVA, Der Duengemittelmarkt 2024/2025 — heavy reliance on imports since 2022, no tonnage split
• Agora Industrie, Standorte, Produktion und Kapazitaeten der Ammoniaksynthese in Deutschland, Abbildung 12 — About 2 950 kt of ammonia in 2020, falling to about 2 Mt in 2022. Read as an image.

Germany grows 2.15 Mha of cover crops and cuts only 53 kha of them for a digester — 39.9 kha of winter and 13.4 kha of summer catch crops in 2022/23. The German digester runs on a main crop instead, which is energyMaizeArea, so this lever starts almost from nothing and the head room above it is large: the spring-crop area that could carry a cover crop at all is about 4 Mha. The maximum of 1.0 Mha is a rule at a fifth of that ceiling, which is as far as a scenario could plausibly push a practice that today reaches 2.5 % of the cover crops there are.

• Destatis, Zwischenfruechte — Anbau auf dem Ackerland — 2022/23: 2.15 Mha of cover crops, of which 39.9 kha winter and 13.4 kha summer grown for energy.

Germany takes almost no straw off the field for energy: of 9.66 Mt of dry matter technically available, 5.23 Mt is already used — 5.18 of it for bedding — and 0.05 Mt goes to energy, which is 0.5 % and rounds to the slider's zero. The maximum of 45 % is the mobilisable pool the biomass monitor identifies, 4.42 Mt, over the technical pool. The pool is a technical potential, not the whole straw production, which is the perimeter difference to know before comparing the German residue_dm_yield of 0.83 t/ha with the French 3.30: the French figure is everything the field produces and the German one is what could be carried away after what the soil needs is left on it.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3) — cereal straw — Theoretical 26.9 Mt DM, technical 9.66, used 5.23 (5.18 as bedding), energetic 0.05, mobilisable 4.42.

583 kha of rapeseed for biodiesel and vegetable oil, and 231 kha of ethanol crops — wheat 113, rye 49, maize 31, sugar beet 11 — 814 kha in all, rounded to the slider's step. The maximum of 1.5 Mha is a rule at not quite twice today; it competes for the same arable hectares as the energy maize and the legumes, and the competition is reported rather than clamped.

• FNR, Statistikbericht 2024, Table 3 — areas for liquid biofuels, 2023

The German lever the French module had no place for. 1.35 Mha of arable land grow a main crop for a digester: silage maize 896 kha, grass and cereal silage 361 kha, grain 78 kha, sugar beet 29 kha and Silphie 10 kha. That is 11.6 % of the German arable area, and it is 2.05 Mha of silage maize in all if the feed maize is counted with it. A cover crop shares its hectare with the spring crop that follows and this one does not, so it enters arable_needed and competes with the plates — which is the whole reason it could not be folded into civeArea. The maximum of 1.6 Mha is a rule, at the same ratio to today the note's maize-only figures carry. Pushing it there is a real scenario and a contested one: the EEG caps maize at 30 % of the feedstock of a new plant, and the arable head room this module reports is what a player sees when they try.

• FNR, Statistikbericht 2024, Tables 1 and 2, and the 2024 press release on renewable-raw-material areas — Energy crops for biogas 1.37 Mha in 2023 and 1.35 Mha estimated for 2024: silage maize 896 kha, grass silage including cover crops 285, cereal silage 76, grain 78, sugar beet 29, Silphie 10.
• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 236 — biogas energy-crop input — 20.9 Mt of dry matter and 305 kt of nitrogen in 2023, which over the FNR area is 15.2 t DM/ha.

The base-year net import, rounded: Germany burned 31.9 TWh of liquid biofuel in 2024 and its own crops and bins made about 15.9 of it, so 16 TWh came from abroad on a net basis. The gross flows are much larger and run both ways — the quota year's own feedstock accounting puts 81 % of the feedstock and two thirds of the fuel outside Germany, because German rapeseed biodiesel is exported while imported used cooking oil is burned here — and the module carries the net, which is what a supply band should score. The maximum of 40 TWh is a rule at two and a half times today.

• BLE, Evaluations- und Erfahrungsbericht 2024 zur Biomassestrom- und Biokraftstoff-Nachhaltigkeitsverordnung — Two thirds of the 2024 feedstock is wastes and residues and one third crops; 19 % of the feedstock comes from Germany, 34 % of the fuel is produced in Germany and 70 % in the EU; the greenhouse-gas saving is 96 % against fossil.

A share of the hot-water service, not of the energy. Germany uses 19.84 TWh of electricity for water heating — 14.97 in dwellings (Eurostat, 2023) and 4.87 in service buildings (JRC-IDEES-2021, 2021) — against 102.17 TWh of gas, oil, wood and district heat. Through the model's own efficiencies, 19.84 × 2.0 / (19.84 × 2.0 + 102.17 × 0.85) = 31 % of the service. France's default is 68 %. Hot water is the German building sector's quietest large gas use. Why provisional: the fuel term includes district heat, which is divided by a boiler efficiency it does not have, and the residential and tertiary halves come from two sources and two years. Both conventions are the French file's, so the two defaults are at least comparable.

• Eurostat nrg_d_hhq, geo=DE, unit=TJ, time=2023 — FC_OTH_HH_E_WH: total 365 743.5 TJ (101.60 TWh), electricity 53 892.5 TJ (14.97 TWh). Pulled by extract/pull_eurostat.py.
• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Tertiary module, SER_hh_fec, 'Hot water', 2021 — electricity 4.87 TWh, gas 18.13, liquid 4.98, district heat 1.81.

German dwellings are almost entirely electric: 40.19 TWh of the 42.29 TWh Eurostat reports for household cooking in 2023, or 95 % of the energy and 98 % of the service. German service buildings are not: JRC-IDEES-2021 puts 28.48 TWh of gas into commercial catering against 11.67 TWh of electricity. Over both, 51.86 × 0.84 / (51.86 × 0.84 + 30.96 × 0.40) = 78 % of the service. Why provisional, and it matters: run the same extraction on France and IDEES gives 25.85 TWh of tertiary catering against the 11.72 TWh the French model carries — a factor of 2.2. If IDEES over-counts German catering by the same factor, the German default is nearer 87 %. The two numbers bracket the answer and neither is a guess. Either way this is the sharpest single national difference in the buildings module and it works against the coarse control: simpleElectrifyUsages buys France a real reduction and buys Germany very little, because German kitchens are already electric.

• Eurostat nrg_d_hhq, geo=DE, unit=TJ, time=2023 — FC_OTH_HH_E_CK: total 152 236.5 TJ (42.29 TWh), electricity 144 688.5 TJ (40.19 TWh).
• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Tertiary module, SER_hh_fec, 'Catering', 2021 — electricity 11.67 TWh, gas 28.48, liquid 1.36, biomass 0.07. France on the same extraction: 25.85 TWh against 11.72 in FR.yaml.

The baseline is this package's own two cooling rows, 6.6 TWh against France's 24, and it is the least trustworthy denominator in the German building block: cooling_tertiary is known to be out by roughly a factor of four, in the direction of understating it, for want of a German tertiary end-use source in harmonised form. A player who moves this slider is therefore moving a percentage of a number that is probably too small. The asymmetry France declares applies here too and is milder: cooling makes a summer peak and the only peak constraint in this model is a winter one. What would close the baseline: a German tertiary end-use breakdown — AGEB or a Zensus-based service-sector survey.

Lighting, appliances, screens and servers. It is the lever that has historically delivered — French specific consumption has been roughly flat for a decade while the equipment count rose — and here it is set against the growth lever below, which is the whole point of having both.

The counterweight to appliance efficiency. Data centres and AI are the part of this that is growing fastest and the part the model is least able to source, so it is left as an explicit assumption rather than given a trajectory it cannot defend.

RTE keeps a few GW of combustion capacity in every 2050 scenario, for the windless fortnight that no amount of storage covers. What it burns is a choice: methane, which draws on the same biomethane everything else wants, or hydrogen, which draws on electricity instead and emits nothing at the stack. Hydrogen is much the dearer of the two, and the model charges it: the electrolytic price the industry module already computes, against a methane price. What it does not do is add the electrolysis back into the electricity the mix has to serve — that would be a fixed point the compiler cannot express, since demand sets the mix and the mix would set demand. The extra electricity is reported instead of hidden.

The model assumed this for every tonne of hydrogen until v0.12.0, which was a strong assumption wearing no clothes: 87 TWh of electricity for hydrogen, and no way to ask what a reformer would cost instead.

A reformer burns and reforms methane. In this model 2050 methane is biomethane, so the colour of the hydrogen depends on the colour of the gas — and it draws on the same biomethane pool as everything else, which is the trade-off worth seeing.

ATR concentrates the CO2 in one stream, which is why it captures at 94% where a reformer with post-combustion capture struggles past 60%. On biomethane this goes negative, and that is not a trick of the accounting: the carbon came out of the air last season and is being put underground. It is also the single most contested line in the model — see the controversy tab — because it makes a scenario's arithmetic depend on a biomass supply chain the model does not represent.

Six German mixes: the three 2045 scenarios of the Netzentwicklungsplan Strom 2037/2045 (version 2025, second draft) and three built from the TYNDP 2024 capacity trajectories for the DE00 node. The default is NEP scenario B, the one that follows the statutory renewables build path. Germany has no nuclear axis — the last three reactors closed on 15 April 2023 and no published scenario rebuilds any, so nuclear is 0.0 in all six rows and that is a value, not a gap. What the German set spans instead is the degree of electrification and the split between domestic electrolysis and hydrogen imports.

• NEP kompakt — Netzentwicklungsplan Strom 2037 mit Ausblick 2045, Version 2025, zweiter Entwurf (13 March 2026) — Tabelle 1 p.4 and Abbildung 4 p.8. The row-by-row arithmetic is in DE.scenarios.yaml.
• ENTSO-E / ENTSOG, TYNDP 2024, 'Final Supply Inputs for TYNDP 2024 Scenarios' (3 November 2023) — Sheets 1.1. to 1.4., node DE00. See extract/extract_tyndp.py.

The chemistry choice, and the sharpest trade-off in the account. LFP carries almost no cobalt (7 grams per MWh against 27 kg) and a quarter of the nickel, but 4.4 times the lithium — 490 kg per MWh against 111. There is no chemistry that is cheap in every metal at once, which is the point of putting it on a slider. Zero by default because the source scenario's 2050 reference is NMC 811.

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, France 2050 — finance_rate

A household and an industrial investor do not face the same cost of capital. Moving this rate from 4% to 8% raises the building indicator by about a third with no physical change at all, which is why it is a lever and not a hidden constant.

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, carbon.csv — linear to 150 €/tCO₂ in 2050

134.6 €/MWh, the German price for an industrial consumer taking 20 000-69 999 MWh a year, excluding recoverable taxes, first half of 2025; the smaller 2 000-19 999 MWh band pays 159.8. France on the same call and the same half-year pays 92.8 and 116.4. German industry pays about 45% more than French industry for electricity, which is the reason most often given for the closures in this file's own industry block, and carrying France's 70 would erase it. The two numbers are not the same quantity and a reviewer must know it. France's 70 €/MWh is a POMMES 2050 model output; this is a 2025 observation. Using an observed price as a horizon assumption says German industrial electricity is as dear in 2045 as it is today, which no German scenario claims. What would close it: an industrial electricity price out of the Langfristszenarien or a dena 2045 run, on the same basis as POMMES.

• Eurostat nrg_pc_205 — electricity prices for non-household consumers, DE, 2025-S1, excluding VAT and other recoverable taxes — DE band MWH20000-69999 0.1346 €/kWh and MWH2000-19999 0.1598; FR 0.0928 and 0.1164 on the same call. Pulled by extract/pull_eurostat.py, which reads both bands.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 550 €/m² is an ADEME order of magnitude with no primary publication behind it even in France. German deep-retrofit costs are higher than French ones and the 19% VAT compounds it, where France applies a reduced 5.5% rate to renovation work — so this number is very likely too low for Germany, and by more than the slider's own step. What would close it: BKI Baukosten, or the KfW/BEG measure-cost statistics, which publish euro-per-square-metre costs by measure and by building class.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, retrofitCost — carried unchanged — Not a German source. See NOTES.md under Placeholders.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 200 €/MWh is an unsourced French 2050 pump price for biofuel and e-fuel, taxes included, and the model's own annex calls it the weakest number in the cost layer. Nothing about it is German. What would close it: a German 2045 fuel-price case — the Langfristszenarien publish one — or the observed Dieselpreis escalated with the CO₂ price the Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz sets, which is at least a German quantity.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, liquidFuelPrice — carried unchanged — Not a German source. See NOTES.md under Placeholders.

The passenger sufficiency control. At 100% it removes 45% of passenger travel and takes air traffic from the workbook's implicit 0%/y to -1.5%/y — the two demand assumptions the transport module is most sensitive to, moved together because a scenario that flies as much as today while driving 45% less is not a coherent story about sufficiency.

Moves the 20% of 2020 car demand still served by a liquid- or gas-fuelled car in the reference onto the electric fleet. The rail transfer is left where it is: electrifying the fleet and shifting trips off it are two different decisions, and folding them together would hide which one paid.

The reference already leaves only 10% of road freight thermal, so this is a small lever by construction, and that is the lesson: on the workbook's own trajectory the remaining road-freight emissions are not where the tonnes are. Hydrogen trucks are left alone, because arbitrating between hydrogen and battery is a detailed-view argument, not a coarse one.

Modal shift away from aviation, which is where the transport module's residual emissions concentrate once the fleet is electric. Distinct from "travel less": this one moves the same journeys onto another mode rather than removing them.

The building sufficiency control, in the unit of the lever it drives because it drives only that one. It starts at the reference 5% rather than at zero: the simple view offers effort beyond the reference scenario, never less than it.

As with sufficiency, this is the stock-performance lever shown in its own unit and bounded below by the reference scenario. 65% across the whole stock is the upper end the workbook contemplates, not a technical limit.

Not shown in this edition. This country's package hides the control; the model reads the lever at the default in the next column.

The materials side of the building question, and the one control in the simple view whose whole interest is how far it cannot reach. At 100% the country builds 8 Mm² of housing and 8 of everything else a year instead of 20.4 and 19.9 — the order of magnitude the official housing-need study reaches for the 2040s — and frames 60% of it in timber instead of 12%. Together those take roughly a quarter off national cement demand. They take far less off steel, because new buildings are about a ninth of it; and they cannot touch the third of cement that is roads, buried networks and bridges, nor the third that nobody has attributed. Two ideas in one control is a deliberate departure. Building less and building in timber are different decisions, and the detailed view keeps them apart; here they are bundled because they are the same material choice seen from a distance, and because a simple view that separated them would have spent two of its dozen controls on one question.

Electrification of heating, with the two consequences that make it a real choice rather than a free win. The wood boilers go with the gas ones, because 95% electric plus 46 TWh of wood would allocate more heat than the stock needs; the resistance heaters go into air-water heat pumps, because electrifying on resistance is what makes the winter peak unmanageable. The peak still rises sharply, and that is the point of the control. Pushing sufficiency and renovation at the same time shrinks the heat need under a fixed 95% share, so the building readout may report over-allocated heat; the model reports it rather than absorbing it.

Hot water and cooking are about as much energy again as space heating, and neither is fully electric today. Their observed electric shares are the starting points, 100% the end.

The industrial sufficiency control. Freight demand is driven here rather than in transport on purpose: freight is what material consumption looks like on a road, and a scenario that halves plastic and cement demand while moving the same tonne-kilometres is not consistent. Steel goes from +30% to -40% against 2020, which is the widest swing any single number in the game commands. The output of the rest of industry is not driven, because its scale starts at today's output and has nowhere lower to go.

Every route change the five value chains offer, moved together: H-DRI steel, the CO2 + H2 olefin route and the biogenic carbon it uses, heat pumps for food-industry steam and direct heat, the lowest clinker ratio in range, and capture on what is left. The processes of the rest of industry are not driven, because the reference already sits at 100% of them.

Efficiency rather than sufficiency or fuel switching: the same product, less energy. At 100% it claims the whole potential RTE identifies and recovers all of the recoverable waste heat, neither of which is costless or instantaneous — the cost panel and the annex say what that means.

The demand end of the food chain, moved as one plate. At 100% red meat falls from 40 to 20 kgec/cap/y — below INRAE's −40% and above ADEME's S1 divide-by-three — poultry from 28 to 18, dairy to 70% of the base year and the edible waste by the SNBC 3's own half. Exports are deliberately left alone: what a country sells is a separate argument from what it eats, and folding them together would let a diet lever cut a herd that is producing for somebody else's plate. The lesson is in the coupling rather than in the total. Two fifths of French beef is a by-product of the dairy herd, so cutting the milk makes the suckler herd grow to meet a beef demand that has not moved; only moving both together shrinks the cattle. A player who moves this control and watches the grassland released is watching the land account answer a food question, which is what the module is for.

The sink side of the land account. At 100% the forest expands at the 90 kha/y IGN's inventory measures rather than the 15 the SNBC 3 plans, the harvest falls from 60 to 45 Mm³/y, the long-lived share of what is still cut rises from 30 to 35%, and artificialisation stops entirely — the Climat et Résilience law's 2050 destination, on this account's own measure. It is the control that most obviously costs something, and that is the point: the forest takes k out of the living stock for every cubic metre cut, 1.5 tCO₂ in France, so every cubic metre not cut deepens the sink and leaves the boiler. Pushed to the top this control takes about a fifth off the wood the scoreboard scores — 127 TWh to 102 — and a scenario that has also electrified its heating will not notice while one that leaned on wood will. The climate case the forest lives through is not driven: it is a scenario choice rather than an effort, it moves the answer further than any of these four, and it stays a fine lever the simple view draws on its own.

The field end of the farm. At 100% the mineral dose on the conventional hectares falls to 50% of the base year and half the arable land goes organic, which between them deliver 26% of the 2024 nitrogen — well below the SNBC 3's own −54% and short of TYFA's zero — the legumes reach the 3.0 Mha the rotation studies stop at, and the whole 17.3 MtCO₂/y of soil-carbon practice INRAE itemises is taken. Four consequences are worth watching rather than assuming. The organic half yields two thirds of what it replaces, and since 0.24.0 the conventional half, at half the 2024 dose, keeps 0.79 of its yield — it is below the plateau — so this control costs arable land: the fields the same plates, herd and exports need grow by more than a third, and the crop block reports the shortfall, 4.2 Mha at 100%, against the land account rather than closing it — fertilising less is not free of land, and the page says by how much. Mineral nitrogen is also an industrial decision here: the same tonnage sets the ammonia the chain has to make, so fertilising less is a hydrogen saving as well as a nitrous-oxide one. More legumes raise the nitrogen balance while lowering the emissions — a legume hectare fixes more nitrogen than the mineral fertiliser its credit replaces, and only the difference between the two emission factors makes the net move downwards, so the balance is not a proxy for the tonnes. And the soil-carbon target is a thirty-year rate on a stock that saturates: the practice has to be kept up after 2050 for the carbon to stay where this account puts it.

The supply side of the biomass the rest of the game spends. At 100% the winter cover crops reach 3.0 Mha, the straw taken off the field reaches 30% — Agro-Transfert's ceiling for less than 2.5% of soil carbon lost — and the land growing fuel reaches 1.70 Mha, nearly three times today's and the IGEDD mission's own upper case. Between them they take the methane supply from 70 to about 86 TWh and the domestic liquid supply from 24 to 52. Two things this control does not do. It does not send manure to a digester: manureMethanised sits at 0 in the reference because the abatement it books rests on an enteric/manure split no French inventory publishes, and burying that argument inside an effort scale would be the wrong place for it. And the fuel crops it plants add no mineral nitrogen, because the dose is an intensity on an arable area held at the base year's: a fuel hectare displaces a food hectare that was already fertilised. The crop block counts the displaced food — the fuel hectare is arable land the plates, the herd and the exports can no longer use, and the headroom says by how much — but the fuel hectare itself adds no nitrogen and no nitrous oxide. That is the module's largest structural simplification and it sits directly under this control.

The workbook converts electricity to hydrogen at 60%. POMMES-INDUSTRY uses 45 MWh of electricity per tonne of hydrogen, which is 74%. The model keeps the workbook value so the cost layer and the electricity indicator describe the same hydrogen; hydrogen is therefore about 40% more expensive here than a POMMES-native calculation gives.

• Teaching workbook, "General hypotheses" sheet E11

Electricity in, liquid e-fuel out, across the whole chain: electrolysis, CO2 supply, synthesis and upgrading. Concawe's techno-economic assessment gives 38% when the carbon comes from direct air capture and 44% when it comes from a concentrated industrial source, and 0.4 sits between the two. It is a whole-barrel figure, not a kerosene-only one: Fischer-Tropsch sends roughly a fifth of its liquids to gasoline and diesel, so the electricity behind one tonne of jet fuel alone is higher — about 38 MWh, or 3.2 kWh per kWh burnt. Use this parameter for total liquid demand, which is what the equations do, and do not quote it as an aviation figure.

• Concawe 2022, E-Fuels: a techno-economic assessment of European domestic production and imports towards 2050 (38% DAC, 44% CCU)
• Boigontier & Girard 2024, Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAFs), MINES Paris - PSL / Zenon Research
• Teaching workbook, "General hypotheses" sheet E10

The UBA's specific CO₂ emission factor for the German electricity mix in 2020. Read it beside the French value before using it: France declares 79 gCO₂/kWh on a life-cycle basis, and 366 is combustion at the stack of German power stations. The two are not the same measurement, and the perimeter difference runs the wrong way — a life-cycle German factor would be higher still, because the upstream of coal and gas is real. For a fossil-dominated mix the uplift is of the order of 10–15 %, so the comparable figure is nearer 400–420 gCO₂/kWh and this constant under-states the German position. For the trend, which is the point of the constant: the same series gives 764 gCO₂/kWh for 1990. Germany has halved its grid factor in thirty years and is still four and a half times France's.

• UBA, Entwicklung der spezifischen Treibhausgas-Emissionen des deutschen Strommix 1990-2020 — 2020: 366 gCO₂/kWh (408 in 2019, 764 in 1990). Read through the UBA publication page, not the report itself; the current edition is CLIMATE CHANGE 13/2025 and would give a life-cycle variant.

A gas or oil water heater, standing losses included.

• ADEME orders of magnitude for domestic hot water production

Above one because it is not all resistance: a 2050 electric water heater stock is a mix of resistance tanks and heat-pump water heaters, the latter at a COP near 3. Two is the blend assumed here and it is an assumption, not a measurement — the honest range runs from 1.0 if nothing changes to near 3 if the stock is heat pumps. It sets how much electricity electrifying hot water actually costs, so it is worth arguing about.

• ADEME, chauffe-eau thermodynamique — COP de 2,5 à 3,5 selon l'installation

• Standard hob efficiencies; a gas burner loses most of its heat around the pan

Induction. The gap with gas is the widest of any usage in the model.

• Standard induction hob efficiency

The carbon actually in the molecule, released whether it is burned or reformed. Distinct from efGas, which is 25 gCO₂/kWh in 2050 because the model's methane is biomethane and the convention books its carbon against the digester feedstock rather than the flame. Both numbers are needed and they answer different questions. efGas answers "what does burning this count as?"; this one answers "how much carbon is there to capture?" A capture plant removes molecules, not conventions.

• Base Carbone ADEME — combustion du gaz naturel, facteur direct

• Teaching workbook, "Synthesis" sheet S42

• Teaching workbook, "Synthesis" sheet S44

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 27 gCO₂/kWh is the fossil energy of the French wood chain. What would close it: UBA ProBas life-cycle records for Holzpellets and Scheitholz. Germany imports a larger share of its pellets than France does and haulage is most of this factor, so the German figure is more likely above 27 than below it.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, ef_wood_2020 — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

Coking coal, 94.6 kgCO₂ per GJ, converted at 3.6 GJ/MWh. The workbook declares coal at 0 gCO₂/kWh in its factor table and then charges it at the hydrogen factor, 66.7 gCO₂/kWh, which is neither. This model uses the published factor and removes the double count that resulted — see steel_bf_process_residual.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, vol. 2 table 1.4 — coking coal, 94.6 kgCO₂/GJ

Germany produced 37.2 Mt of crude steel in 2024, 70.9 % by the oxygen (blast-furnace / basic-oxygen) route: 37.2 × 0.709 = 26.375 Mt. This is the single largest blast-furnace stock in the European Union and it is what makes Germany the most valuable port of this game — France's equivalent row is 9.9 Mt, so the steel decision that is a side-show on the French board is the main event on the German one. Note the base year. The rest of this file is 2019; the only harmonised published split by process is worldsteel's for 2024, so these two rows are 2024. Corroboration from the same publication: German pig-iron production was 24.3 Mt in 2024, consistent with a 26.4 Mt oxygen route charging 15–20 % scrap.

• worldsteel, World Steel in Figures 2025, 'Crude steel production by process 2024', p.10 — Germany 37.2 Mt total, oxygen 70.9 %, electric 29.1 %. France 10.8 (62.7 / 37.3) in the same table.

37.2 Mt × 29.1 % electric = 10.825 Mt. Same source and same base year as the blast-furnace row.

• worldsteel, World Steel in Figures 2025, 'Crude steel production by process 2024', p.10

The total direct intensity of the integrated route — every source on site, not a process term. It was inherited from the teaching workbook as "the blast furnace's process figure", and under that name it had been counted on top of the coal it mostly is. Re-sourced in 0.27.0, it holds: the IPCC Tier 1 defaults summed over the chain give 1.87 tCO₂/t (1.46 for the converter, which already includes the blast furnace, plus 0.56 per tonne of coke and 0.20 per tonne of sinter); the EU ETS benchmarks, set on the best tenth of European plants, chain to about 1.4; and ArcelorMittal Dunkerque, at 6.8 Mt of steel and about 12 MtCO₂ a year, is at 1.76. The model charges the route's coal its own published factor, so this figure is never booked as such: steel_bf_process_residual keeps the remainder. The limitation: 1.76 and the 0.62 t of coal charged beside it describe a furnace about 20% better than the world average — worldsteel's route average is 780 kg of coal, which at this model's factor alone would release 2.08 t. The two are consistent with each other and should be changed together or not at all.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 3, Ch. 4, Table 4.1 p. 4.25 — BOF 1.46, coke 0.56, sinter 0.20 tCO₂/t
• Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/447, Annex — hot metal 1.288, sintered ore 0.157, coke 0.217 allowances/t
• Direction générale des Entreprises (15 January 2024), France 2030 : soutien à la décarbonation d'ArcelorMittal Dunkerque — 6.8 Mt/y, ≈ 12 MtCO₂/y
• worldsteel, Raw materials — 780 kg of metallurgical coal per tonne of BF-BOF steel

What an electric furnace emits on site besides its electricity: the graphite electrodes it burns and the carbon charged to foam the slag and carburise the melt. The IPCC's Tier 1 default, and the floor of the published range — the EU ETS benchmark for carbon steel is 0.215, because it also covers the gas burners and the ladle furnace. It applies to both electric routes, from scrap and from hydrogen-reduced iron, since both end in the same furnace. Until 0.27.0 the model gave these two rows no direct term at all, so the only steel that emitted on site was the blast furnace's.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 3, Ch. 4, Table 4.1 p. 4.25 — EAF 0.08 tCO₂/t
• Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/447, Annex — EAF carbon steel 0.215, high-alloy 0.268 allowances/t

German structure with a French coefficient, and it should be replaced. No German olefin production statistic was secured. What exists is JRC-IDEES-2021's chemical-industry output index, "Basic chemicals (kt ethylene equivalent)": 22 905.5 kt for Germany in 2019 and 9 323.3 kt for France. The French model's olefin row is 3 656 kt — ethylene plus propylene, the C4 cut excluded since 0.23.0 — so the index over-states the French olefin tonnage by a factor 2.550; dividing the German index by the same factor gives 8 982 kt. It was 11 315 while the French anchor still carried the C4. That is a French ratio applied to a German measurement, not a German measurement. It is the right order — German ethylene capacity is commonly given as about 5.5 Mt/y and propylene adds roughly two thirds again — but it is an inference. What would close it: Eurostat PRODCOM (the ethylene and propylene codes were not resolved), Destatis Fachserie 4 Reihe 3.1, or VCI Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany and France, Industry module, sheet CHI, 'Physical output (kt) / Basic chemicals (kt ethylene eq.)', 2019 — DE 22 905.5 kt, FR 9 323.3 kt. Extracted by extract/extract_industry.py; the calibration is printed by extract/build_country_rows.py.

The carbon a tonne of olefin can physically hold, which is the ceiling on any claim that the product stores CO₂. Ethylene and propylene are both 85.63% carbon by mass, so a tonne holds 0.8563 × 44.009 / 12.011 = 3.138 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. Nothing about the route changes it: it is the polymer's own composition. It replaces a coefficient of 4.3 that was 37% above this ceiling. The old figure came from the teaching workbook's "Industry" sheet K48 with no derivation, and it reproduces exactly as the CO₂ fed to the front of the route rather than the carbon locked in the product: 2.988 tonnes of methanol per tonne of olefin (methanol_per_olefin, published) times the 1.3735 tCO₂ per tonne of methanol that stoichiometry demands is 4.105, and 3.138 / 4.105 = 0.765 is an ordinary light-olefin selectivity for a methanol-to-olefins step. The 0.97 tCO₂ of difference leaves as C₄⁺, coke and purge gas; it is consumed by the plant, not stored by the polymer, and crediting it was double-counting the losses as a removal.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 3, Ch. 1 §1.3.1 — feedstock carbon is stored, and released when the product is oxidised
• Atomic masses: C 12.011, O 15.999, H 1.008 (IUPAC 2021)

German cement production in 2019, on the same base year as the rest of the industry block. Cross-checked two ways: VDZ gives "around 35.0 million tonnes" for 2021, and Andrew's clinker series gives 25 069 kt of clinker for 2019, an implied clinker ratio of 0.733 that matches the 2021 pair's 0.735. A caveat large enough to be a decision rather than a footnote: German clinker production has since collapsed, from 25 736 kt in 2021 to 18 549 in 2024. On the same ratio that implies roughly 25 Mt of cement in 2024, a quarter below the figure used here. 2019 is used because both of its terms are measured and because it is this file's base year. Read the France check with the same care: the model's French row is 16 500 kt against 19 964 kt from IDEES for 2019, a ratio of 0.826, so the two are not on the same perimeter and the German figure should not be compared cell to cell with the French one.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Industry module, sheet NMM, 'Physical output (kt) / Cement (kt)', 2019 — 34 185.3 kt.
• VDZ (Verein Deutscher Zementwerke), cement industry overview — 'around 35.0 million tonnes of cement in 2021'; 53 works, 33 of them with clinker production.

The decarbonation of the limestone, and nothing else: 6 193 ktCO₂ of calcination in the French inventory for 11 759 kt of clinker in 2020. The neighbouring years give 0.524 (2019) and 0.531 (2021), and it is what stoichiometry predicts: the IPCC's 0.51 × 1.02 for kiln dust = 0.52 for a 65%-lime clinker, 0.53 at 67%. No change of kiln fuel can remove it — only capture, or less clinker. It was 0.7925, and that was a total wearing the wrong name. The old value was 10.2 MtCO₂ over 12.87 Mt of clinker. 10.2 Mt is not the calcination line for any year France has published — that line ran 6.19 to 6.81 over 2015–2021 — but it is inside the range of the whole cement industry's CO₂, calcination and kiln fuel. And 12.87 Mt was not an observation: it is 16 500 × 0.78, this model's own cement anchor times the top of its own clinkerRate slider. The kiln fuel is charged separately through the energy account, so it was emitted twice — and carbonCapture, which multiplies this term, was capturing fuel CO₂ under a name that said it could not. The limitation. 0.527 is a French fleet average for one year, and it moves with the lime content of the clinker and with how much of the lime comes from slag or ash instead of carbonate: the IPCC's range is 0.47 to 0.53. It is also domestic clinker; about a quarter of the clinker behind French cement is calcined abroad, outside this perimeter.

• Conseil national de l'industrie / DGE (May 2023), Feuille de route de décarbonation de la filière Ciment, Tableau 2-1 p. 7 — calcination 6 809 / 6 193 / 6 489 ktCO₂ in 2019 / 2020 / 2021 (SECTEN, GEREP)
• France Ciment / SFIC, Le ciment en chiffres 2022, p. 4 — clinker 13 005 / 11 759 / 12 222 kt in 2019 / 2020 / 2021
• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 3, Ch. 2, Eq. 2.4 p. 2.12 — EF = 0.51 × 1.02 = 0.52 tCO₂/t clinker
• See docs/industry/steel_and_cement_base.md, §4

What a French kiln burns to make a tonne of clinker: 3 830 MJ in 2021, down from 3 942 in 2015. It closes against the roadmap's own statement that the sector burned 13 TWh of heat in 2021 for 12 222 kt of clinker — three published quantities, one identity, no residual. The sector aims at 3 600 MJ in 2030 and 3 500 in 2050, which is the 9% the industrial efficiency lever can take off. It replaced 0.700 in 0.29.0, the teaching workbook's figure, a third short.

• Feuille de route de décarbonation de la filière Ciment (May 2023), Tableau 3-1 p. 12 — 3 942 MJ/t (2015), 3 830 (2021), 3 600 (2030), 3 500 (2050); p. 8 — 13 TWh of heat in 2021

The biomass share of the waste a French kiln burns: 52% in 2021, from 49% in 2015 — animal meal, wood waste, sludge — where the rest is tyres, solvents, oils and plastic-rich refuse-derived fuel. The biomass half is charged to the wood carrier; the fossil half goes with the coke and the coal, whose emission factor it shares within a few per cent. The sector aims at 60% by 2050; this keeps the observed share, because a higher one needs a biomass supply the model would have to find somewhere.

• Feuille de route de décarbonation de la filière Ciment (May 2023), Tableaux 3-2 and 3-3 p. 12 — substitution rate 38% (2015), 44% (2021), 85% (2050); biomass share of the waste 49%, 52%, 60%

14.3 MtCO₂ of fossil carbon in 2019, the inventory's "other fossil fuels" under public electricity and heat production, 1.A.1.a: the fossil half of the household and commercial waste burned with energy recovery. The German inventory books it in energy, as the French one does, and leaves only crematoria and bonfires in 5.C. 156 thermal treatment plants took 25.0 Mt of waste that year. It is an upper bound for incinerators. The same row carries the substitute-fuel plants and the waste co-fired in public coal plants, so part of it is not an incinerator stack at all. 2023 is 13.0, and the inventory carries 2023 into 2024 because the waste statistics come every two years. The plastic share of it is not published; the French 95% is carried across, and says what it is.

• Germany, CRT submission to the EU, 15 March 2026, Table 1.A(a)s1, 1.A.1.a, other fossil fuels — 14.347 MtCO₂ (2019), 13.025 (2023 and 2024)
• UBA (2025), National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Climate Change 40/2025, pp. 113, 126–127 (perimeter of 'other fossil fuels'), p. 133 (2024 carried from 2023), p. 717 (waste incineration with energy recovery reported in 1.A.1.a)
• Destatis, Abfallentsorgungsanlagen 2019, Input nach Art der Anlage — thermal waste treatment plants 25.02 Mt, 156 plants

How much of an incinerator's fossil CO₂ is plastic: 95%. French residual household waste is 14.7% plastic by mass, 2 410 kt a year (ADEME, MODECOM 2017). At the IPCC's defaults — plastics are 75% carbon and all of it fossil — that is 6.63 MtCO₂. Everything else in the bin that carries fossil carbon adds 0.35: textiles 0.15 (20% of their carbon is fossil), nappies and other hygiene products 0.12, shoes and leather 0.06, soiled paper 0.02. 6.63 / 6.98 = 0.95. It is what makes plasticReduction reach the incinerator, and it is why the other 5% does not move with it. The limitation: the composition is household waste, and the fleet also burns commercial waste, which is if anything more plastic; the composites and small appliances — plastic as well — are left out rather than guessed, which errs low.

• ADEME (2019), MODECOM 2017, Campagne nationale de caractérisation des déchets ménagers et assimilés, p. 16 — OMR composition: plastics 14.7% (2 410 kt), textiles 3.0% (497 kt), nappies 691 kt, other hygiene 496 kt, soiled paper 1 095 kt, shoes 121 kt, leather goods 34 kt
• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 5, Ch. 2, Table 2.4 — dry matter, carbon and fossil-carbon fractions: plastics 100/75/100%, textiles 80/50/20%, nappies 40/70/10%, rubber and leather 84/67/20%, paper 90/46/1%

The German inventory splits household and municipal waste 1:1 between fossil and biogenic energy, a fixed assumption rather than a radiocarbon measurement. It sets only what a capture plant takes alongside the fossil: one biogenic tonne for each fossil one.

• UBA (2025), National Inventory Report Germany 2025, p. 113 and p. 127 — fossil and biogenic fractions of household waste in a ratio of 1:1 (Hoffmann et al. 2011)

The fossil CO₂ a tonne of plastic releases when it burns: 75% carbon, all of it fossil, times 44/12. It converts the plastic part of the incinerators' CO₂ back into tonnes, which is what a recycling line receives and draws its electricity on.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 5, Ch. 2, Table 2.4 — plastics: dry matter 100%, carbon 75%, fossil fraction 100%; the same 2.75 is the factor FNADE/FEDENE (2023) attributes to Citepa

Sorting, washing, extruding: the JRC gives 0.3 to 0.7 MWh of electricity a tonne for mechanical recycling and next to no heat. The middle is taken. Chemical recycling by pyrolysis would need more, and no inventory of it is public.

• JRC (2023), Environmental and economic assessment of plastic waste recycling, EUR 31423, PDF p. 54

Steam processing, steam drying and steam cooling in the German food, beverages and tobacco branch, 2019: 29.61 + 2.14 + 0.40 TWh. provisional because the France check does not pass: the same three rows give 28.62 TWh for France against the 21.876 TWh the French model carries, a ratio of 0.76. IDEES's steam block is wider than the workbook's, so the German figure is likely to be an over-statement of the same order. What would close it: a German branch-level process-heat study — the Fraunhofer ISI / IREES industrial process-heat work behind the Energieeffizienzgesetz.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Industry module, sheet FBT_fec, 2019 — Food: Steam processing 29.61 TWh · Steam drying 2.14 · Steam cooling 0.40. France on the same rows: 26.35 + 1.90 + 0.36 = 28.62 TWh.

Direct-fired heat in the German food branch, 2019: direct heat thermal 2.31 + process heat thermal 1.92 + thermal drying 2.50 + thermal cooling 1.00 + ovens 3.61 + specific process heat 3.00 TWh. The France check gives 12.66 TWh against the model's 10.693, a ratio of 0.845 — just inside the band, so the mapping is close but not exact.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Industry module, sheet FBT_fec, 2019 — The six thermal rows of the Food block; the same six for France sum to 12.66 TWh.

German structure with a French coefficient. No German figure for merchant hydrogen in the food industry was secured — IDEES reports no hydrogen at all in industrial final consumption for 2019 — so the French 0.138 TWh is scaled by the size of the two food branches: German food, beverages and tobacco used 59.31 TWh of final energy in 2019 against 58.05 TWh in France, a ratio of 1.0218, and 0.138 × 1.0218 = 0.141. It is a very small number and no lever moves it; it is here so the hydrogen account has no hole.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany and France, Industry module, sheet FBT, 'by fuel (EUROSTAT DATA)', 2019 — DE 5 100.7 ktoe = 59.31 TWh; FR 4 991.8 ktoe = 58.05 TWh.

One for Germany, and that is the clearest single win of this port. In France the constant exists because the workbook's surface × surfacic need over-states the observed heat and has to be scaled down by 0.6528. The German building_segment table is not built that way: its surfacic need column is JRC-IDEES-2021's own thermal energy service per square metre, so surface × surfacic need reproduces the observed heat by construction and the correction is exactly 1. The level is right as well as the arithmetic. The German table sums to 511.93 TWh of useful space heat; running the same extraction on France gives 377.82 TWh against the 359.34 TWh the French model calibrates onto, a ratio of 0.951 — inside the 15 % band, so the quantity IDEES calls thermal energy service is the quantity the model calls heat need. One thing this loses and the interface should say: IDEES's space-heating total also carries 7.13 TWh of circulation pumps, which belong to no heating system and are not in the sixteen segments.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Residential and Tertiary modules, RES_hh_tes / RES_hh_tess and SER_hh_tes / SER_hh_tess, 2021 — Surface per heating system is derived as TES / TES-per-m²; the derived total is checked against the published stock area and the extraction fails above 0.5 % disagreement. See extract/extract_buildings.py.

German structure with a French coefficient, and the hardest item in the port — hard for a structural reason rather than a bibliographic one. France's 40 GW is the winter power drawn by electric space heating, and Germany barely has any: three per cent of dwellings had a heat pump or solar thermal at the 2022 census, and German dwellings are 56 % gas and 19 % oil. The German winter peak is not a heating peak. Construction: the model's own base-year peak expression — Σ over the electricity rows of building_vector of need × unit_2020 / peak efficiency × peak share — gives 18.176 TWh-equivalent for the German stock and 52.170 for the French one. France anchors 52.170 at 40 GW, so the coefficient is 0.7667 GW per TWh-equivalent and Germany lands at 13.9 GW. What that assumes, stated: that German electric heating is as peak-coincident as French electric heating. It is probably less so — German night-storage heaters are deliberately off-peak and §14a EnWG lets the network operator curtail heat pumps — so 13.9 GW is more likely an over-statement than an under-statement. What would close it: the Bundesnetzagentur Leistungsbilanz, or the load chapter of the NEP main report. The alternative the scoping study recommends — drop the absolute anchor outside France and score the ratio — needs an interface change and is not available here.

• Derived from countries/FR/FR.yaml building_peak_2020 = 40 GW and this file's own building_segment — The arithmetic is printed by extract/build_country_rows.py under `peak`. Not a German measurement.

KSG sector 4, Verkehr, 2024. Domestic transport; international bunkers are a memo item outside the total.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025 (2026 reporting round), sheet 'THG kurz' — Read with extract/extract_uba.py. The six sectors close on the published total to 1e-13 MtCO₂e.

KSG sector 3, Gebäude, 2024 — CRF 1.A.4.a plus 1.A.4.b.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet 'THG kurz'

KSG sector 2, Industrie, 2024 — CRF 1.A.2 combustion plus the whole of CRF 2, industrial processes. It is 2.4 times the French industry line, which is the size of the difference this port exists to show.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet 'THG kurz'

A projection, not a target. The 2024 amendment to the Klimaschutzgesetz replaced the per-sector annual budgets with one national budget path, so Germany has no statutory 2045 industry figure. What this is: the UBA's 2026 projection with existing measures, which leaves 69.9 MtCO₂e in the industry sector in 2045. The interface must call it a projection wherever France's column says SNBC.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt (14 March 2026), section 3.2 — 'sodass 2045 noch 69,9 Mio. t CO2-Aq. verbleiben'.

KSG sector 5, Landwirtschaft, 2024.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet 'THG kurz'

A projection, and an interpolated one. The UBA's 2026 Projektionsbericht publishes agriculture to 2030 (58.2 MtCO₂e) and says of the years after it only that "bis 2045 ist nur ein leichtes Sinken der Treibhausgasemissionen erkennbar". This is that sentence made numerical: 58.2 declining at 0.4 %/year for fifteen years gives 54.8. What would close it: the annual series behind the Projektionsbericht, which is in the UBA datacube (a single-page application this extraction could not query) or in the EEA's national-projections datahub.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.5 and Tabelle 5 — Tabelle 5: 61.4 (2026) … 58.2 (2030). The 2045 value is this file's interpolation of the report's own qualitative statement.

KSG sector 6, Abfallwirtschaft und Sonstiges, 2024. Down 87 % on 1990: the 2005 ban on landfilling untreated organic waste is the single most effective instrument in the German inventory.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet 'THG kurz'

A projection, interpolated on the same basis as agriculture. The Projektionsbericht gives 4.0 MtCO₂e in 2030 and says the landfill ban keeps reducing emissions "fortwährend bis zum Jahr 2050 und darüber hinaus"; continuing at half the 2026–2030 rate for fifteen years gives 3.0 MtCO₂e.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.6 and Tabelle 6 — Tabelle 6: 4.7 (2026) … 4.0 (2030).

KSG sector 1, Energiewirtschaft, 2024 — CRF 1.A.1. Six times the French energy line, and the reason a German player's electricity decisions move the national total in a way a French player's do not.

• UBA, Emissionsübersichten KSG-Sektoren 1990-2025, sheet 'THG kurz'

A projection, and the residual of one. The Projektionsbericht gives the 2045 gross total (212.5 MtCO₂e) and three of the six sectors — industry 69.9, buildings 11.2, transport 23.6 — but not the split of the remaining 107.8 between energy, agriculture and waste. With agriculture at 54.8 and waste at 3.0 as interpolated above, energy is 212.5 − 69.9 − 11.2 − 23.6 − 54.8 − 3.0 = 50.0 MtCO₂e. Fifty megatonnes from a power system the same report has running on 80 % renewables looks large until you read what the sector contains: the report says a third of it is power generation and the other two thirds are waste incineration plants and fuel refineries.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, sections 2 and 3.1 — 'In 2045 verbleiben Brutto-Emissionen, also ohne LULUCF und technische Senken, in Höhe von 212,5 Mio. t CO2-Äq.' The residual arithmetic is this file's.

Positive: German land use is a net source, not a sink. The German LULUCF balance was +36.5 MtCO₂e in 1990, +47.6 in 2020, +73.3 in 2023 and +57.8 in 2024, on the UNFCCC convention where the sector total is positive when the sources outweigh the removals. The forest sub-sector alone was a net sink of −19.3 MtCO₂e in the 2025 proxy year and the rest of the land account more than cancelled it. Every French assumption around this number — that the sink is negative, that the slider runs from −40 to −5, that the default absorbs 23 — is wrong for Germany. The model already allows it: naturalSink is a signed magnitude and national_natural_sink is its negation.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, row '4. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry' — 1990 +36 494.891 kt · 2024 +57 838.853 kt. Extracted by extract/extract_uba.py.

Still positive in 2045 on the UBA's own projection with existing measures — the land account is expected to be emitting 26 MtCO₂e in the target year. Set against KSG §3a, which requires a balance of at least −40 MtCO₂e, that is a gap of 66 MtCO₂e, larger than any other single shortfall in German climate law. The statutory figure is carried in DE.official.yaml as published2050TotalSinks so the interface can show the projection and the law side by side rather than one of them.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.7 (LULUCF) — 'in 2040 um mehr als 64 Mio. t CO2-Aq. (+29 Mio. t gegenüber der Vorgabe von -35) und in 2045 um mehr als 66 Mio. t. CO2-Aq. (+26 Mio. t CO2-Äq. gegenüber der Vorgabe von -40)'.

Engineered removals at the horizon, negative for absorption. Germany has no statutory volume, so unlike France's −43 this is not a closure residual: it is the UBA's projected capture under existing measures — 0.7 MtCO₂e in 2030, 4.7 in 2040 and 6.2 in 2045.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 3.2 — 'im Jahr 2045 6,2 Mio. t CO2-Äq. abgeschieden'.

There is no German equivalent of the SNBC's gross 2050 total. The Klimaschutzgesetz sets net neutrality in 2045 and one national annual budget ending at 438 MtCO₂e in 2030, and no gross figure for the target year. 212.5 MtCO₂e is the UBA's projection of what is left in 2045 under existing measures — a projection of failure rather than a target, and the interface must say so. It is the number a German pathway should be read against, because it is what the country is currently on course for.

• UBA, Treibhausgas-Projektionen 2026 — Ergebnisse kompakt, section 2 — 'In 2045 verbleiben Brutto-Emissionen … in Höhe von 212,5 Mio. t CO2-Äq.'

What the model represents of the German industry sector, on the inventory's own basis: the sum of JRC-IDEES-2021's CO₂ emissions over the eleven manufacturing branches the model covers, for 2019 — iron and steel 43.08, non-metallic minerals 36.66, chemicals 22.33, other industrial sectors 8.41, food 7.85, paper 6.13, machinery 4.87, non-ferrous metals 3.33, transport equipment 2.93, textiles 0.56, wood 0.32. The France check is the reason this is derived and not provisional: the identical extraction gives 67.79 MtCO₂e for France against the 68.9 the French model declares, a ratio of 1.016. Against the KSG industry line of 149.77 MtCO₂e for 2024, the perimeter difference is 13.3 MtCO₂e — construction and refining sit inside the inventory sector and outside manufacturing, and the two figures are five years apart.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Industry module, 'CO2 emissions (kt CO2)' of each of the eleven branch sheets, 2019 — Extracted by extract/extract_industry.py; the France comparison is printed by extract/build_country_rows.py.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: this is RTE's figure after CEREN, for French industry. It is carried because it is a ratio — the share of industrial fuel a study finds can be saved — rather than a German stock, so applying it to German fuel gives a German saving. What is being assumed is that German industry has the same identified headroom as French industry, which is a claim about how much has already been done and is probably optimistic: German industry has been under an efficiency-agreement regime France has no equivalent of. What would close it: the Fraunhofer ISI / Prognos Energieeffizienz-Potenziale work behind the NAPE and the Energieeffizienzgesetz, or the branch-level potentials in the BfEE efficiency reports.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, fuel_efficiency_ceiling — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

42.8 MJ/kg, the standard lower heating value of jet A-1.

• Standard lower heating value of aviation kerosene

The anchor for today's ticket. Everything that is not fuel is derived from it through the fuel share of operating cost, so an error here moves the whole non-fuel block.

• EASA, European Aviation Environmental Report 2025, fuel price 2023

Combustion only — neither the upstream chain nor non-CO₂ effects.

• ICAO; corroborated by the US Energy Information Administration

2045 − 2019. Germany's horizon is 2045 and its aviation demand data is 2019, so the compounding window is 26 years against France's 30. A demand-growth slider therefore buys the German player four fewer years of compounding at the same rate — a small change with a real effect at the top of the slider.

• meta.horizon 2045 and meta.base_year 2019 of this file

2045 − 2019, the same window, because the German traffic and efficiency statistics are the same 2019 IDEES extraction.

• meta.horizon 2045 and meta.base_year 2019 of this file

The raw German statistic on the same construction as the French one: all aviation fuel — passenger and freight, domestic and international bunkers — divided by passenger-kilometres. 121.8 TWh over 266.0 Gpkm in 2019 is 0.458 kWh/pkm, and at 11.9 kWh per kilogramme of kerosene that is 38.5 g/pkm. It is higher than the model's own aviation rows because it also carries the freight in the holds and reflects actual load factors — exactly as in France, where the published statistic is 29.3 g/pkm. provisional because the France check gives 35.3 g/pkm from this extraction against the 29.28 the French model carries, a ratio of 0.83, and because the year is 2019 rather than 2024.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Transport module, TrAvia_act and TrAvia_ene, 2019 — Passenger fuel 106.7 TWh, freight 15.2 TWh, passenger activity 266.0 Gpkm. Extracted by extract/extract_transport.py.

Lower heating values, used to turn POMMES prices per tonne into prices per MWh.

• Standard lower heating values for hard coal, natural gas and hydrogen

• Standard lower heating value of methane

• Standard lower heating value of hydrogen

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, import_hourly.csv, France 2050

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, import_hourly.csv, France 2050

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, import_hourly.csv, France 2050

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, import_hourly.csv, France 2050

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, import_hourly.csv, France 2050

Household band DC (2 500–4 999 kWh/year), all taxes and levies included, first half of 2025. France's equivalent in the same series is 267 €/MWh: German households pay about half as much again for electricity, which changes every payback the building cost module computes.

• Eurostat nrg_pc_204 — electricity prices for household consumers, DE, 2025-S1 — 0.3835 €/kWh. Pulled by extract/pull_eurostat.py; France 0.2671 €/kWh on the same call.

Household band D2 (20–199 GJ/year), all taxes included, first half of 2025. France is at 129.9. The German electricity-to-gas price ratio is therefore 3.15 against France's 2.06 — and that ratio, not the absolute prices, is what decides whether electrifying a German boiler saves the household money. It is the reason the German heat-pump case is different and it deserves its own line in the interface.

• Eurostat nrg_pc_202 — gas prices for household consumers, DE, 2025-S1 — 0.1216 €/kWh. France 0.1299 €/kWh on the same call.

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 77.5 €/MWh is the Propellet index for France. Eurostat publishes no wood series. What would close it: the DEPV (Deutscher Energieholz- und Pellet-Verband) Pelletpreis index, which is monthly and national; German pellet prices have run in the 300–350 €/t range, which at 4.8 kWh/kg would be 63–73 €/MWh, but that range was not read from the index itself and is not used here.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, price_wood — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

Structural concrete dosages run roughly 250 to 400 kg a cubic metre, and 300 is the middle of the structural range. It is not the 266 kg a cubic metre that the cement-and-concrete literature uses for "béton équivalent": that figure is a whole-economy bookkeeping factor that already absorbs mortars, renders, screeds and bagged cement, and applying it to building cement alone overstates the concrete by about seven tenths. Used only to express the construction module's cement as a concrete tonnage in the materials account; no emission depends on it.

• Usual structural concrete dosage range; cross-checked against The Shift Project's 266 kg/m³ béton-équivalent factor, which is a different perimeter

Ordinary reinforced structural concrete. Presentation only, like the dosage above.

• Standard value for ordinary reinforced concrete, used in the comparative life-cycle assessment this module's timber coefficients come from

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

The cement kiln fuel appears in the cost model but NOT in the physical model, which gives cement only its grinding electricity. Cement combustion CO₂ is therefore missing from the emissions account — a known defect of the workbook, recorded here rather than silently patched.

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv, solid_fuels mode 1

What an amine capture plant on a cement stack draws, per tonne of clinker, when it captures 95% of the stack: the heat that regenerates the solvent, raised electrically, plus the compression and the fans. Per tonne captured it is 0.54 / (0.95 × 0.86) = 0.66 MWh, which is where the published figures put it: an advanced solvent needs 2.3 to 3.3 GJ of heat a tonne at the reboiler, and compression to 150 bar another 132 kWh. A cement works has no steam to spare, unlike an incinerator, so the heat has to be raised, and since 0.32.0 the model raises it with electricity the power system has to supply. The capture plant treats the whole stack, the biogenic CO₂ of the kiln's waste included, so this is charged per tonne of clinker rather than per fossil tonne.

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv — reference_plant_CCS less reference_plant
• Raillard-Cazanove (2024), PhD thesis, Table 2.11 p. 43, after Quevedo Parra & Romano (2023) — MEA capture on a cement kiln: 270 €/t clinker of capacity, 95% captured, 0.54 MWh/t clinker
• Bui et al. (2018), Carbon capture and storage (CCS): the way forward, Energy Environ. Sci. 11, 1062, Table 4 — reboiler heat 3.6–4.0 GJ/tCO₂ for MEA, 2.3–3.3 for advanced solvents
• Keith et al. (2018), A Process for Capturing CO₂ from the Atmosphere, Joule 2, 1573, Table 1 — compression 1 to 150 bar, 132 kWh/tCO₂

The capture rate at which cement_capture_extra_electricity was measured. The lever's share of the stack is divided by it, so the plant draws its published figure exactly at 95% and proportionally less below.

• Raillard-Cazanove (2024), PhD thesis, Table 2.11 p. 43, after Quevedo Parra & Romano (2023)

The biogenic CO₂ the biomass half of a kiln's waste releases — animal meal, wood waste, sludge — at the IPCC's default for "other primary solid biomass", 100 t a terajoule. It is never counted in the emissions; it is the tonnage a capture plant takes with the fossil, and so what the transport and storage of cement capture are charged on.

• IPCC 2006 Guidelines, Vol. 2, Ch. 2, Table 2.2 — other primary solid biomass, 100 000 kgCO₂/TJ

What capture costs an incinerator in electricity, per tonne captured, fossil and biogenic alike. The plant has its own steam: the IEAGHG's two reference plants, 20 MWe each, extract 40 to 45% of the turbine's steam at 6 bar to regenerate the solvent at 3 GJ a tonne, which costs them 6.0 and 6.8 MWe, and compression and liquefaction take 2.8 and 3.2 MWe more. Over 27.9 and 31.8 t captured an hour, both come to 0.315 MWh a tonne, and both halve the plant's net output. The electricity an incinerator no longer exports is electricity the mix has to produce, so the model books it as a demand. Where the plant feeds a heat network a heat pump can win back part of it; the IEAGHG's third case does, and this does not.

• IEAGHG (2020), CCS on Waste to Energy, Technical Report 2020-06, Section A, sheet 60 of 84 — cases 1 and 2: 6 + 2.8 MWe and 6.8 + 3.2 MWe for 90% capture of 31 and 35.3 tCO₂/h

The capture plant on an incinerator — its capital and the running costs that are not energy — per tonne captured. The energy is charged apart, at the industrial electricity price, and so are transport and storage. Provisional, and the evidence is thin at both ends. The one techno-economic study of a retrofit gives a cost of capture of 90 to 156 € a tonne for plants of 3 to 12 kt a year, a tenth of a French incinerator. The one plant being built, Oslo's Klemetsrud, budgets 8.4 billion kroner at P50 for 350 kt a year, about 720 M€: at this model's 8% over 25 years that is close to 200 € a tonne in capital alone, for a first of its kind with its own harbour terminal. The cement plant in this model costs under 50 € a tonne on the same basis, from a gas twice as concentrated. 100 sits between them.

• Bertone et al. (2024), Techno-Economic Assessment of Amine-Based Carbon Capture in Waste-to-Energy Incineration Plant Retrofit, Sustainability 16(19) 8468 — 90–156 €/tCO₂ at 12 and 3 kt/y
• IEA Bioenergy (2025), Full-scale Waste-to-Energy CCS in Norway, BECCUS Phase 2 — Klemetsrud: CAPEX P85 NOK 9.5 bn, P50 8.4 bn; OPEX NOK 0.31 bn/y; 350 kt/y captured; 1 € ≈ 11.6 NOK (March 2025)

Shipping or piping a captured tonne to a storage site and injecting it. 50 € is the figure France Stratégie retains for French industry. Models that assume a shared network at scale go lower — 17 to 21 € in the IND-OPT study — and the one French cluster costed so far, Dunkirk, comes out at 120 to 160 €, because the CO₂ leaves by ship for a reservoir in the North Sea. Charged on every tonne stored, biogenic ones included, since a ship does not sort them either.

• France Stratégie (May 2023), Les coûts d'abattement — partie 5, Industrie, ch. 4 §3, pp. 38–40 — transport and storage at 50 €/t stored
• Raillard-Cazanove, Knibiehly & Girard (2025), J. Cleaner Production 508, 145511 — transport and storage 21.2 €/t (2030), 17.2 (2050)
• ADEME (2024), ZIBAC Dunkerque — 120–160 €/t

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv, steam methane reforming

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, emission_factor

• POMMES-INDUSTRY, conversion_factor.csv, methanol-to-olefins

Residential 3 841.4 Mm² plus services 3 518.7 Mm², both JRC-IDEES-2021 for 2021. The France check passes handsomely — the same extraction gives 4 187.1 Mm² against the 4 200 the French model declares, a ratio of 1.003 — and the German figure is still marked provisional, because a passing mapping check is not the same as a plausible answer. Here is the problem, and it is the largest single defect in this package. IDEES's German services floor area is 3 518.7 Mm², or 42 m² per inhabitant, against 15.5 in France and 47 in Spain. Divided into the German services space-heating consumption it implies 48 kWh/m² of final energy and 34–44 kWh/m² of useful heat, which is two to three times below any German non-residential building typology. The energy is Eurostat-consistent and is not in doubt; the area is modelled from employment and is. The consequence to watch: the energy the model computes is right because it is surface × intensity and the two errors cancel, but anything priced per square metre — retrofit cost, heat-pump cost, the renovation count — is over-stated in the German tertiary sector by the same factor. What would close it: the IWU / Wuppertal Institut Nichtwohngebäude-Bestandsmodell, or the German building typology (TABULA) for the residential half.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, RES_summary 'Total households useful surface area' and SER_summary 'Total services useful surface area', 2021 — 3 841 438 thousand m² and 3 518 747 thousand m². Extracted by extract/extract_buildings.py.

Demand reduction achieved by one deep renovation, used to convert the average stock improvement into an equivalent number of deep renovations.

• ADEME orders of magnitude for a BBC-rénovation-level retrofit

• Conventional lifetime for building-envelope work

• Conventional lifetime for a residential heat pump

PLACEHOLDER — French value carried, not German data: 80 €/m² is an ADEME order of magnitude for an air-to-water heat pump in France. German installed costs are higher — the standard 19 % VAT rather than France's reduced 5.5 % accounts for about 13 % of the difference on its own — so this under-states the German cost. What would close it: the BKI Baukosten database, or the KfW/BEG funding statistics, which publish average measure costs per dwelling.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, heat_pump_cost_per_m2 — carried unchanged — Not a German source. Listed in NOTES.md under Placeholders.

Germany has no reduced VAT rate on renovation work: building services are charged at the standard 19 % rate, against France's reduced 5.5 %. The German instrument is on the income-tax side instead — §35c EStG, a credit on energy-efficiency measures in owner-occupied homes — which this model has no place for. A small number with a visible effect: the same retrofit costs about 13 % more in the German cost module than in the French one for purely fiscal reasons, and the German subsidy is invisible unless it is said out loud. provisional because the statute itself was not opened.

• Umsatzsteuergesetz (UStG) §12 — renovation is absent from the reduced-rate list of Absatz 2 — Not read in this session. The absence of a reduced construction rate in Germany is well established but should be checked before shipping.

41 473 831 German households in 2021. The France check is 31.221 million from the same source against the 31.377 the French model carries — a ratio of 1.005 — so the definitions agree. Note this is households, not the 43.1 million dwellings the 2022 census counts; the two are different quantities and the model wants the first.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, RES_summary, 'Number of households', 2021 — 41 473 831. France on the same row for the same year: 31 221 358.

German structure with one French coefficient. The Eurostat household budget survey gives, per German household in 2020, 1 549 PPS for the purchase of vehicles (CP071) and 534 for maintenance and repair (CP0723). Transport insurance is not published separately — Eurostat gives only total insurance (CP125), 1 537 PPS in Germany against 2 101 in France — so the French transport-insurance term of 508 €/household is scaled by that ratio to 372, giving 1 549 + 534 + 372 = 2 455. The France check on the two measured terms is what licenses this: France's CP071 + CP0723 + the same insurance term is 2 551 against the 2 541 the French model carries, a ratio of 0.996. Two caveats: the unit is purchasing power standards rather than euros, and German and French comparative price levels differ by about two points, so the conversion is left implicit; and the survey wave is 2020.

• Eurostat hbs_exp_t121 — mean consumption expenditure per household by COICOP purpose, 2020 — DE: CP07 4 330, CP071 1 549, CP072 2 088, CP0723 534, CP125 1 537 PPS. FR: 3 822 / 1 763 / 1 536 / 270 / 2 101. Pulled by extract/pull_eurostat.py.

The whole transport budget of a German household, COICOP division 07, 2020. The France check is as clean as it gets: 3 822 PPS from the same call against the 3 803 €/household the French model carries, a ratio of 0.995, so the French constant is this Eurostat line and the German one can be read straight off it.

• Eurostat hbs_exp_t121, geo=DE, coicop=CP07, 2020 — 4 330 PPS per household. France 3 822 on the same call.

Total car vehicle-kilometres divided by the car fleet, Germany 2019: 538 950 million km over 47 715 977 cars. The France check gives 11 080 km against the 11 600 the French model carries, a ratio of 1.047. Worth seeing behind the average: a German diesel car does 17 634 km a year and a German petrol car 8 205. The fleet average is the average of two very different populations, and an electrification lever that moves the diesel half moves more than half the kilometres.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, Transport module, TrRoad_act, 'Vehicle-km driven' and 'Stock of vehicles', 2019 — Extracted by extract/extract_transport.py, which computes it per fuel as well as in total.

A pinned model output: the car fleet this model computes at the German reference scenario, used as the denominator of the fleet ratio so that household ownership cost scales with fleet size. Seeded here at the observed German fleet of 2019 and re-pinned from the model's own run by python3 app/tools/pin_reference.py --country DE.

• JRC-IDEES-2021, Germany, TrRoad_act, 'Stock of vehicles — Passenger cars', 2019 — 47 715 977 cars. Replaced by the model's own reference output once it runs.

New forest does not store carbon the year it is planted. Hectares planted less than ten years before the horizon are left out of the afforestation term altogether, which is a crude step where the truth is a curve; the alternative — a growth function nobody in the sources publishes — would be a curve we invented.

New forest is booked at the expansion rate rather than at the average per-hectare rate of the standing forest, because a young stand does not store like a mature one. The same source gives 5.0 for a renewal plan on existing forest and 0.2 to 2.4 for the rest of the forest depending on management and climate; 3.0 is the expansion line.

• IGN–FCBA (2024), Projections des disponibilités en bois et des stocks et flux de carbone du secteur forestier, table 15

1.0 tC/ha/y lost for twenty years when permanent grassland is ploughed, converted here at 44/12. The interval on it is ±40%, and the stock difference between the two uses (84.6 against 51.6 tC/ha over 0–30 cm) would imply 1.65 tC/ha/y if all of it were lost before a new equilibrium — it is not, and the modal value is what the inventory uses. These coefficients are measured on one country's soils and a port should check them against its own; they are shared because soil chemistry does not stop at a border, not because they are beyond argument.

• Citepa for the Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2021), Incertitudes liées à la comptabilisation des puits de carbone dans les sols, fig. 12 — after Arrouays et al. (2002)

0.5 tC/ha/y regained for twenty years when arable land goes back to grass, converted at 44/12. Half the loss rate, and deliberately so: the same source's finding is that "loss is twice as fast as gain", which is what makes re-grassing a slower repair than ploughing was a break.

• Citepa for the Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2021), Incertitudes liées à la comptabilisation des puits de carbone dans les sols, fig. 12 — after Arrouays et al. (2002)

How long a hectare goes on emitting, or storing, after it changes use. Twenty years is the tail the inventory applies, so at a horizon 26 years away only the last twenty years of conversions are still in the flux.

• Citepa for the Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2021), Incertitudes liées à la comptabilisation des puits de carbone dans les sols, tables 7 and 9

This edition carries the land module. naturalSink is hidden and inert, the sink is the seven-class account below, the agriculture sector is the constructive chain of the food block, and the three biomass bands are the supplies the bioenergy block computes.

2024 to 2045 — this edition's own horizon. The land survey behind the account is dated 31 December 2023 and the inventory year is 2024, so twenty-one years is the span every rate in this block is sustained over. France's is twenty-six, and that difference alone makes every German flow lever worth a fifth less than the same lever in France.

9.4 cubic metres a hectare a year of gross increment, in Vorratsfestmeter Derbholz mit Rinde — the fourth national forest inventory's own figure for its 2012-2022 period, and 16 % below the 2002-2012 period. The German forest is growing more slowly than it was, and that is measured rather than modelled.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

1.8 cubic metres a hectare a year left standing or lying dead: total departures from the live stock, 110.1 Mm3, less the harvest converted to the same volume unit, 72.6 / 0.8 = 90.75 Mm3, over 10.8 Mha. The 0.8 conversion is the harvest-loss and bark convention and is not verified in the pages this port read. Calamities caused 49 % of all departures over the inventory decade — 44.8 Mm3 a year on 2.0 Mha — and a third of the calamity wood stayed in the forest. This constant is the decade's mean, so it carries the 2018-2020 bark-beetle catastrophe; 2024 alone was a much quieter year.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

10.8 Mha of Holzboden — the wood-producing area the inventory's per-hectare figures are stated on, implied by 101.5 / 9.4, 110.1 / 10.2 and 72.6 / 6.7, which agree. It is not the land account's forest class of 10.689 Mha and not the inventory's headline forest area of 11.5 Mha: the three are three perimeters and the module keeps them apart. 87 % of the area is unrestricted and 6 %, 0.69 Mha, is closed to harvest.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

3.67 billion cubic metres standing, 335 m3 a hectare — the largest standing timber stock in Europe. Spruce lost 220 Mm3, 18 % of its stock, between the 2017 carbon inventory and 2022. Nothing in the model reads this constant; it is displayed so a reader can put the annual flows beside the stock they come out of.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

75.6 million cubic metres Erntefestmeter ohne Rinde: the official 2024 harvest of 61.183 Mm3 divided by the 0.81 coverage the forest-sector research institute's own back-calculation finds for the statistic. The 14.4 Mm3 of difference is firewood cut and never sold, and it is 19 % of the German harvest against 28 % of the French one. It is in Efm and the identity runs on Vorratsfestmeter, which is what forest_harvest_volume_factor converts. The inventory's own use figure for its decade, 72.6 Mm3 Efm a year, is close to this and is a decade mean rather than a year.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.
• Thuenen, Einschlagsrueckrechnung (Jochem, Weimar, Dieter 2025) — 81 % coverage — Quoted at search level; the page and the PDF returned HTTP 429. Recorded as not verified.
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

1.18 tonnes of CO2 a cubic metre of the volume balance, from the inventory's own stock pair: 1 184 Mt of carbon in living trees over 3 670 Mm3 of standing volume is 0.323 tC a cubic metre, whole tree and roots included, per cubic metre of Derbholz stock. It is not comparable with the French numbers, which are stated on bois fort tige: the French marginal, 1.5, is read off harvest projections, and the French level, 2.0, is the inventory's published sink over its balance rather than a stock ratio. A stock density is both a level and a margin at once, so forest_carbon_ratio_base is set equal to it and the German line stays proportional. A cross-check against the German inventory: the biomass line for 2023 is a source of 24.3 MtCO2 with an official harvest of 70.6 Mm3 Efm, and the identity at that harvest gives a source of 31.6 — the same sign, 30 % high, because the period emission factors are calibrated on logged wood and increment in 2018-2023 was below the decade mean. Recalibrate on the 2026 submission's biomass line when it can be read.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022
• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables

Equal to forest_carbon_k. The German coefficient is a stock density, 1 184 MtC in 3 670 Mm³, which is a level and a margin at once; there is no separate sink-over-balance pair to anchor, so the living-biomass line stays proportional, as it was before France's was split.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

0.33 tonnes of CO2 a cubic metre of annual mortality: the inventory's dead wood line for 2023, a sink of 6.4 MtCO2, over the 19.3 Mm3 of mortality that produced it. German dead wood grew a third in ten years, to 323 Mm3 and 46.1 Mt of carbon, and the 6.4 is the transient of that build-up. Since 0.34.0 only this base-year flux is read: the pool then decays at forest_dead_wood_half_life, so a severe climate case refills it only by what has not decomposed by the horizon.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

Provisional: IGN–FCBA's French value, carried. Germany's own numbers point the same way or faster. 46.1 MtC of dead wood, 169 MtCO₂, taking in about 23 MtCO₂ a year — 19.3 Mm³ of mortality at forest_carbon_k — and keeping 6.4 of it is a half-life of about seven years; decay rates measured on German logs give 13 years for beech and 21 for spruce. At ten, the dead-wood sink falls from 6.4 to 1.5 MtCO₂/y by 2045 and the national net rises by 4.9 MtCO₂e. The land-sink line stays inert: the German land account is a source.

• IGN–FCBA (2024), §5.2.2 p. 53 — the French projection value, a half-life « fixée ici à 10 ans »
• Herrmann, Kahl & Bauhus (2015), Decomposition dynamics of coarse woody debris of three important central European tree species, Forest Ecosystems 2:27
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen) — dead wood 323 Mm³, 46.1 MtC

The largest single calibration in the German package, and it is named rather than smoothed. The published lines it should carry are small: forest mineral soils including litter are a sink of 0.43 MtCO2 and fires plus mineral soil nitrous oxide a source of 0.15, so the measured mineral term is +0.28. This constant is +9.41, and the +9.13 difference is the residual that reconciles a decade-mean forest identity with a single year's category total. Where it comes from, precisely. The forest identity runs on the fourth inventory's 2012-2022 means — an increment of 101.5 Mm3, a mortality of 19.4 and a harvest of 94.5 in stock volume — and those means contain the 2018-2020 bark-beetle catastrophe. The target is the 2024 forest-land line of the national trend table, +2.14 MtCO2e, which is a quiet year: calamity wood was 27.3 Mm3 against a record 60.1 in 2020, and the harvest was the lowest in years. No published German source gives a 2024 increment or a 2024 mortality, and the only pool split available is the 2023 one of the previous inventory report — which the 2026 vintage has since revised, moving 2023 forest land from +20.9 to +7.5 MtCO2e. Three alternatives were tried and rejected. Recalibrating forest_carbon_k needs 0.44 tCO2/m3, a third of the stock ratio, and it would make the harvest lever almost powerless. Recalibrating the harvest needs 69.4 Mm3 Efm, which contradicts the Destatis rows the harvest closure is asserted on. Recalibrating the mortality needs 0.8 m3/ha/y, which contradicts a decade in which calamities were half of all departures. Loading the residual onto the one term France also treats as a residual is the least bad of the four, and this why is what makes it visible. What would close it: the 2024 pool split of the German 2026 inventory submission, which was not available when this package was written.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

Zero. The German territory and the German inventory are the same perimeter; there is no overseas forest to carry. France's 10 MtCO2 is Guiana.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

33.253 Mm3 Efm o.R. of Stammholz in 2024, 54.3 % of the official harvest and 44.0 % of the harvest including the informal firewood.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.

12.233 Mm3 of Industrieholz — pulpwood and panel wood — in 2024.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.

12.548 Mm3 of Energieholz sold in 2024. 2024 is the first year German energy wood passed industrial wood, which is a change in the wood chain worth knowing before reading the wood supply.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.

14.417 Mm3 by difference: 75.6 of removals less the four reported uses. It is 19 % of the German harvest, against 28 % of the French one, and it rests entirely on the 0.81 coverage ratio, which is not verified. An independent check: the inventory's own use figure of 72.6 Mm3 a year over 2012-2022 against a Destatis mean of about 64.5 over 2013-2022 gives the same 12 % gap from a completely different pair of numbers.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.
• Thuenen, Einschlagsrueckrechnung — 81 % coverage; not verified
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

3.149 Mm3 of nicht verwertetes Holz in 2024 — felled and left in the forest. This is the fifth harvest row Germany needed and France does not have. It leaves the live stock, so the forest identity charges it as a removal; it reaches no boiler, so the wood supply must not count it as fuel. Folding it into the informal firewood, which was the alternative, would have handed the German wood supply 6.7 TWh of fuel that does not exist.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.

The conversion France does not need. One cubic metre of the German harvest statistic — Erntefestmeter ohne Rinde, felling losses and bark excluded — is 1.25 cubic metres of the standing stock the increment and the mortality are measured in. The 0.8 ratio behind it is the harvest-loss and bark convention the forest inventory uses when it reconciles its own use figure with its departures, and it is not verified in the fetched pages: it is the factor that makes 110.1 = 72.6 / 0.8 + mortality close. It is worth a quarter of the harvest term of the forest identity, so a reviewer who doubts the 0.8 should read the forest pool as carrying that doubt.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

German structure, a French coefficient, and nothing reads it. The stage-A flow reading of the wood-products pool is kept only so it can be shown beside the stock reading; since stage E the pool is a first-order-decay stock and no result depends on this number. No German flow coefficient is published — the national wood carbon monitor integrates half-lives instead — so the French value is carried for the comparison line.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, hwp_coefficient — carried for the comparison line only

44.0 % of the German harvest becomes sawn timber and panels: 33.253 Mm3 of sawlogs over 75.6. It is twice the French 22.5 %, because the German forest is half spruce and pine and the German sawmilling industry is three times the size.

• Destatis, Holzeinschlag nach Holzartengruppen und Holzsorten 2024 — 2024, 1 000 m3 Efm o.R.: total 61 183; Stammholz 33 253; Industrieholz 12 233; Energieholz 12 548; nicht verwertetes Holz 3 149.

Measured on one building and cross-checked against element coefficients, because no whole-building intensity by structural system is published anywhere. The anchor is an eight-storey, 142-dwelling mass-timber residential building whose bill of materials was compared with a functionally equivalent concrete one: 519 to 553 kg/m² of concrete avoided over 13 766 m² of gross floor area, which at 280–320 kg of cement a cubic metre and a density of 2 380 kg/m³ is 61 to 74 kg of cement, and 67 is the middle. A timber building is not a building without concrete, and that is the point of a saving rather than a substitution. The same measured building still carried 288 kg/m² of concrete in its foundations, its ground floor and its toppings, and used more lean concrete than its concrete twin. Against the 137 kg/m² this model books for new French housing, 67 is close to half — which is the right order: négaWatt reaches −46% of concrete at 80 to 95% timber, and half of 90% is 45. The competing way to model this is a displacement factor in tonnes of carbon avoided per tonne of carbon in the wood, and it is deliberately not used here. That literature has moved from 2.1 (Sathre and O'Connor 2010, 21 studies) to 1.2 (Leskinen 2018, 51 studies) to 0.55 at market level (Hurmekoski 2021, 44 studies, range 0.27–1.16), with a French critique arguing the benefit has been overstated several fold. A kilogramme of cement not made is a physical quantity this model already prices and emits; a displacement factor is an argument about counterfactuals. The model takes the physical route and leaves the argument to the annex.

• FPInnovations / Gouvernement du Québec, comparative LCA of an 8-storey mass-timber residential building (Arbora, Montréal) — bill of materials
• Hurmekoski et al. 2021, «Substitution impacts of wood use at the market level», Environmental Research Letters — market-level displacement factor 0.55 (0.27–1.16)
• FCBA/BIPE 2019 for CODIFAB, FBF and ADEME — element-level equivalences: 1 kg of wood replaces 5.24 kg of concrete and 0.18 kg of rebar in a load-bearing CLT façade

From the same measured building, and deliberately the net figure: the timber structure removes about 21 kg/m² of reinforcement, and adds back steel balconies, galvanised studs and brick support, so the whole-building balance is roughly −17 kg/m². Against the 21 kg/m² this model books for new French housing that is most of it — which is exactly why the national effect is small: new buildings are about a tenth of French steel, so even a wholesale switch to timber moves the steel bar by a few percent. ADEME's own biosourced scenario finds −2% then −5% on steel against −2% then −8% on cement, and this model reproduces that asymmetry rather than asserting it.

• FPInnovations / Gouvernement du Québec, comparative LCA of an 8-storey mass-timber residential building — whole-building steel balance
• ADEME 2019, «Prospective de consommation de matériaux pour la construction des bâtiments», scénario «développement des biosourcés»

Two independent anchors agree, which is the only reason this number is here at all. The measured mass-timber building carries 2 597 m³ of cross-laminated timber, glulam beams and glulam columns over 13 766 m² — 0.189 m³/m². The French biosourced-building label's top level asks for 45 kgC/m² for housing, which at the carbon content and density of softwood is 0.200 m³/m². Light timber frame sits well below both, so 0.189 is a mass-timber figure and overstates what an ossature-bois house uses; the model says so rather than splitting a coefficient it cannot source.

• FPInnovations / Gouvernement du Québec, Arbora mass-timber building — 2 047 m³ CLT + 378.2 m³ beams + 171.6 m³ columns over 13 766 m²
• Arrêté du 2 juillet 2024, label «bâtiment biosourcé» — 45 kgC/m² for level 3 in housing

A sawmill turns roughly half of a sawlog into sawn timber; the rest is slabwood, sawdust and bark, and most of it is sold as chips, pellets or panel furnish rather than lost. The factor is what lets construction timber demand be compared with the long-lived harvest the forest account already computes, and 2.0 is the round number the trade uses. It is provisional because a national yield is not published on the same perimeter as this model's harvest.

• Agreste, «Récolte de bois et production de sciages en 2024» — 18.3 Mm³ of sawlogs against 8.16 Mm³ of sawnwood produced

Zero, matching the hidden timberShare lever, so the timber term is identically zero everywhere in this edition.

Minus 0.41: the German wood-products pool was a source in 2024, for the first time in the series. It absorbed 8.06 MtCO2 in 2020 and 1.42 in 2023, and the collapse follows the construction downturn — less sawn timber going in while the existing stock goes on decaying. In the module's convention a sink is positive, so this is negative.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

0.8373 tCO2 a cubic metre of long-lived product, which is the IPCC 2019 Tier 1 carbon density of sawnwood, 0.229 tC/m3. It is a physical default and not a German measurement: no German inflow in tonnes of CO2 was available, so the density cannot be derived here the way it is in France, where the national report's own 10.0 MtCO2 of inflow over 11.95 Mm3 gives the same number to half a per cent. German softwood is a little lighter than the French mix, so this is more likely high than low. What would close it: the harvested-wood-products tables of the 2026 German submission.

• IPCC 2019 Refinement, Volume 4 Chapter 12 — Tier 1 sawnwood carbon density 0.229 tC/m3 — Used as a physical default. The French package derives 0.8373 independently from its own inventory inflow, which is the cross-check that makes it usable here.

German structure, a French coefficient. 28.87 years is the IPCC Tier 1 half-lives of sawnwood, panels and plywood weighted by the French inflow mix. The German mix is more sawnwood and less panel, which would lengthen it a little. Nothing German was read; what would close it is the half-life assumptions of the German submission's wood-products model.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, hwp_half_life — the IPCC half-lives, weighted with a French inflow mix

The wood-products stock the pool's 2020 balance implies: at the base-year inflow of 27.8 MtCO2 and a decay rate of 2.40 %/y, a pool absorbing 8.06 MtCO2 net holds 824 MtCO2. The derived base-year stock is 1 177, and the 353 MtCO2 between them is hwp_stock_check — not an error to be closed but the size of a four-year swing in a published balance, from a sink of 8.06 to a source of 0.41. A reader should treat the German wood-products pool as the least stable line of the six.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

Mineral grassland absorbs 0.74 tCO2 a hectare a year; the organic soil under a sixth of it emits 27.1. The published pools for 2023 put strict grassland at a source of 28.5 MtCO2e of which 28.1 is organic soil, with biomass a sink of 6.3 and mineral soils a sink of 4.9; on the account's own 6.135 Mha and the 2024 category total of +24.18 the mineral term calibrates to +0.74. This is the entry the peat split exists for. Without it the coefficient would have had to be -5.1 tCO2 a hectare to reproduce the same total, and then every equation that grazes fewer hectares — a smaller herd, a diet with less beef — would have raised German emissions. The sign of a German herd result depends on this one decision.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

0.69 tCO2 a hectare a year emitted by mineral cropland, calibrated on the 2024 cropland line of +17.52 once the 9.52 MtCO2 of drained organic soil under 0.34 Mha of it is taken out. The published 2023 split reads 47 % organic soils, 45 % mineral soils and 7 % biomass; the small biomass term is inside this coefficient rather than beside it.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

157 tonnes of CO2 a year per thousand hectares of annual land take, once the settlement peat is held constant. All-in, the 2024 settlements line of 4.64 MtCO2e over 19.2 kha a year would read 242; 89 kha of drained organic soil under German settlements emits 1.63 MtCO2e whatever happens to the land-take rate, so booking it on the flow would have made the net-zero-land-take target look worth half as much again as it is. It is a standing emission per unit of flow, so stopping land take takes this line to 1.63 rather than to zero.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq
• Destatis, Statistischer Bericht Flaechenerhebung nach Art der tatsaechlichen Nutzung 2023 (33111)

The wetlands line less its own organic soils: 8.95 MtCO2e in 2024, of which 41.9 % is organic soil, leaves 5.20 for the methane of man-made water bodies and everything else. Held constant, as in France — nothing in the game moves it.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

What a rewetted hectare still emits: about 5 tCO2e a year, mostly methane. Rewetting stops the peat oxidising; it does not make the hectare a sink on a twenty-one-year horizon, and a model that took the emission to zero would overstate the German peat lever by about a sixth. The figure is the order of magnitude the European rewetting literature converges on and the German fact sheets quote; no single German primary giving a national mean was opened, so it is provisional. It is uniform across classes on purpose — what differs between an arable bog and a forest bog is the drained factor, which is per class in land_class.

• Greifswald Moor Centrum, Faktenpapier — rewetted peat soils in the range of a few tonnes of CO2e a hectare, dominated by methane — Reached at search level; recorded as provisional.

Zero. German rewetting has run at a few thousand hectares a year against 1.95 million drained, and the emission factors the inventory publishes are measured on the drained area as it stands — what has already been rewetted is outside that area rather than inside it at a lower factor. The base-year pool check therefore runs on the whole drained area at the drained factor, which is what the inventory measures.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables

2.33 tCO2e a hectare a year of nitrous oxide from drained agricultural organic soil, booked in agriculture and not in land use. The inventory reports 12.3 kt of nitrous oxide from organic soils inside CRT 3.D — 3.26 MtCO2e — on the 1.353 Mha of cropland and grassland peat. It is declared apart from the peat_ef of the same soil because the two sectors are two lines, and it is kept out of ef_other_crop_n2o because it is not a response to fertiliser: a drained bog mineralises its own nitrogen, and leaving it inside the nitrogen factor would have let a German nitrogen cut switch off 3.3 MtCO2e it has no effect on. Rewetting switches it off entirely, which is what the equation does.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025), LULUCF tables
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

German structure, a French coefficient, and the weakest number in this block. No German assessment of the agricultural soil-carbon potential was read. The French potential per hectare of arable land is applied to the German arable area — 14.777 MtCO2 on 17.265 Mha, scaled to 11.656 — which is an arithmetic and not a measurement. German evidence argues it is smaller, not larger: the national soil inventory of farmland finds no significant change in topsoil carbon under unchanged management and a loss on dry arable sites. soilCarbonPractices starts at zero in this edition, so nothing in the German reference depends on it; a player who moves that slider is moving this number. What would close it: the Thuenen humus-building work, or the UBA and Thuenen agricultural mitigation catalogue.

• Thuenen Report 64, Landwirtschaftlich genutzte Boeden in Deutschland, p. 8 — No significant change of topsoil carbon under unchanged management; a loss on dry arable sites. Mineral soils 0-30 cm hold 61 tC/ha under arable and 88 under permanent grassland.
• countries/FR/FR.yaml, soil_practice_potential_arable — 14.777 MtCO2 on 17.265 Mha, rescaled to the German arable area

The same arithmetic on grassland: 2.53 MtCO2 on France's 9.139 Mha, scaled to Germany's 6.135. Same caveat, same source, same zero default.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, soil_practice_potential_grassland — rescaled to the German grassland area

Three shares where France has one, and none of the three is published. Germany's land-take split is not reported as a share anywhere this port read. What is measured is the forest side: the forest inventory finds 16 kha of the 66 kha of forest lost over its decade went to industry, commerce and transport, about 1.6 kha a year against a land take of 19.2 — which is the 8 % the forest share carries. The rest is farmland, and the arable and grassland split of it is set at three parts to one on the composition of the German agricultural area. The three shares sum to one, so the semi-natural class supplies nothing: German building spreads onto farmland and forest, not onto heath. What would close it: the land-use change matrix of the national inventory, which gives the transitions in hectares.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 — Waldland: 66 kha of forest lost over the decade, 16 kha of it to industry, commerce and transport
• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 344 — the land-use matrix that would give the exact split, not read for this port

The grassland share of German land take, on the same reading and with the same gap behind it. France declares 0 here because its own accounting does not separate grassland from arable land in what is built on; Germany declares a share because the class matters — 17 % of 19.2 kha a year is 69 kha of grassland over the horizon, against a grassland class of 6.13 Mha.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 344 — the land-use matrix that would close it

8 % of German land take comes out of forest: 1.6 kha a year of the 19.2, from the forest inventory's own 16 kha of forest lost to industry, commerce and transport over ten years. It is the one of the three shares with a measurement behind it, and it is the one that matters most per hectare, because forest is the only class whose conversion removes a standing carbon stock.

• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 — Waldland — 66 kha of forest lost over the 2012-2022 period, 16 kha of it to industry, commerce and transport.

19.2 thousand hectares a year: Siedlung and Verkehr grew from 5 207 377 ha at the end of 2023 to 5 226 558 ha at the end of 2024, +19 181 ha. The daily indicator reads the same fact as 50 hectares a day — 34 for settlement, 17 for transport, less 1 given back — against 53 in 2023 and 77 in 2010. It is the rate the base-year settlements pool is calibrated on, so it and artificialisation_carbon_content have to be read together.

• Destatis, Statistischer Bericht Flaechenerhebung nach Art der tatsaechlichen Nutzung 2023 (33111)

6 thousand hectares a year of net forest gain, from the land survey: Wald grew 10 688 592 to 10 694 619 ha between 2023 and 2024. The forest inventory's own net figure for its decade is 1.5 kha a year, four times smaller, from gross flows of +8.2 and -6.6; the survey's figure is used because the survey is the account. It is the largest unreconciled flow in the German land account, as the equivalent disagreement is in the French one.

• Destatis, Statistischer Bericht Flaechenerhebung nach Art der tatsaechlichen Nutzung 2023 (33111)
• Bundeswaldinventur 2022 (Thuenen), inventory period 2012-2022

Negative: German grassland has been gaining. Dauergruenland went from 4 654.7 kha in 2010 to 4 714.3 in 2024, +4.3 kha a year, which in this module's sign convention — positive ploughs grass into crops — is -4.3. The EU greening rules are why: ploughing permanent grassland has needed authorisation since 2015.

• Destatis, Dauergruenland nach Art der Nutzung — 4 654.7 kha in 2010, 4 714.3 kha in 2024.

Zero: no German soil-carbon practice programme is booked in the inventory, so the base year takes none of the potential. It is the value soilCarbonPractices is read at where the module is switched off.

CRT 4.A forest land, 2024: a source of 2.14 MtCO2e. It was a sink of 26.45 in 1990 and of 1.99 in 2020, and a source of 7.49 in 2023. The German forest stopped absorbing during the drought decade, and the inventory says so.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

CRT 4.G harvested wood products, 2024: a source of 0.41 MtCO2e, against a sink of 8.06 in 2020 and 1.42 in 2023.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

CRT 4.C grassland, 2024: a source of 24.18 MtCO2e — the second largest single line of the German land account, and 28.7 of it is the 1.06 Mha of drained organic soil under German grassland. France's grassland absorbs 5.7.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

CRT 4.B cropland, 2024: a source of 17.52 MtCO2e, of which 9.5 is drained organic soil. It was 26.75 in 1990 and 30.59 in 2023; the year-to-year swing is large because the mineral-soil term follows the weather.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

CRT 4.E settlements, 2024: a source of 4.64 MtCO2e, of which 1.63 is the 89 kha of organic soil under German settlements and the rest is the land take itself.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

CRT 4.D wetlands, 2024: a source of 8.95 MtCO2e — five times France's 1.2 — of which 41.9 % is organic soil, split between peat extraction and terrestrial wetlands, and the rest is largely the methane of man-made water bodies.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq

One, by definition: dietDairy is an index on the base year, so the base year sits at 100%. It is declared rather than written into the formula so that the switched-off branch of the module names what it reads.

Zero: the base year has cut none of its own waste, because the waste share is measured on it.

One: the export volumes the table declares are the base year, so the index that scales them is one there.

One, like livestock_export_base: the export hectares the crop block declares are the base year's, and the index that scales them is one there.

One: mineral_n_base is the base-year delivery, and nIntensity is a percentage of it.

Zero, and this is a statement about the calibration rather than about farming practice: the per-head emission factors are fitted to the observed inventory year, so whatever low-methane feeding that year already contained is inside the factors. The lever measures the change from there, and the change at the base year is nothing.

Zero, for the same reason as enteric_mitigation_base: the digesters the base year already runs are inside the observed emission factors, and the lever books the change from there. It is not a claim that no manure is methanised today.

Zero: the base year burns all of the fossil fuel the inventory measures on its farms.

The observed emission factor of fossil liquid fuel, the value efLiquid slides away from and the one the base-year farm burned. It is used in one place only — to say how much energy the base year's farm fuel represents — and no emission is charged at it.

The natural logarithm of two, which turns a half-life into a first-order decay rate: k = ln 2 / half-life. Declared once rather than written into a formula, like the nitrogen fraction of ammonia, because a number that appears in an equation should be a number a reader can find.

• IPCC (2006), Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Vol. 4, Ch. 12, Equation 12.1 — k = ln(2)/HL

14 ÷ 17: the nitrogen in a tonne of ammonia, from the atomic masses. It is the one number in this module that is chemistry rather than statistics, and it is what turns a nitrogen demand into an ammonia tonnage for the industry chain.

• IUPAC atomic weights: N 14.007, H 1.008 — 14.007 / 17.031 = 0.8225

The population the food balance divides by: 83.51 million at 30 June 2024, the mid-year denominator the BLE itself uses. Destatis's end-of-year figure is 83.577 million; using the balance's own denominator keeps the per-capita quantities and the totals one arithmetic.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024
• Destatis, Bevoelkerungsstand — 83.577 million at 31.12.2024

80.33 million in 2045, the moderate variant of the 16th coordinated population projection (G2L2W2). It is a fall of 3.8 % from the base year, where the French horizon population rises 1 %, and it is the single largest driver of the difference between the two references' agriculture: every diet-driven quantity in this module is scaled by it. The migration variants span 77.92 to 82.75 million, which is +/- 3 % on the herd.

• Destatis, 16. koordinierte Bevoelkerungsvorausberechnung, Statistischer Bericht 12421, sheet 12421-b02 — Variante 2 (G2L2W2, moderate development) for 2045: 80.33 million. Variante 1 (low migration) 77.92, Variante 3 (high) 82.75.

Pork 35.5 plus beef and veal 11.8 plus sheep and goat 0.70 kilograms of carcass weight a head in 2024. The edible weight of the same basket is 38.2 kg; the module works in carcass weight because that is the unit the supply balance publishes and the unit the production chain is written in.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024

20.9 kg of carcass weight a head in 2024, 13.7 as edible weight — the one German meat whose consumption has risen and the one whose self-sufficiency is below one.

• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024

A labelled placeholder. Germany measures its food waste well — 10.8 Mt along the whole chain in 2022, 6.3 Mt of it in households — and does not publish the avoidable share of the food supply, which is what this constant is. 7 % is the French figure carried across, and it is displayed rather than driving: since stage E the waste that moves the chain is the per-product share in animal_product and crop_food_waste_share, and this constant only feeds the comparison line food_waste_basket_share. What would close it: the avoidable fraction in the Thuenen baseline study, which was not fetched.

• BMLEH, Lebensmittelabfaelle in Deutschland — 10.8 Mt (2022), households 58 %
• countries/FR/FR.yaml, food_waste_base — the 7 % is carried from there and is not a German measurement

Four fifths of German beef is a by-product of the dairy herd, against two fifths in France, and it is what makes the German suckler herd almost irrelevant: 0.62 million suckler cows could yield at most about 0.19 Mt of the 1.05 Mt of beef Germany produces, so the rest comes from the dairy herd's culls and its calves. The consequence is worth knowing before reading any German diet result: cutting dairy consumption alone grows the suckler herd here even harder than it does in France, because the beef the dairy herd was supplying has to come from somewhere. A Schlachtungen-by-category series would replace the derivation with a measurement.

• Destatis, Rinderbestand November 2025 — 618 088 other cows (suckler) of 10.42 million cattle
• BLE, Versorgungsbilanz Fleisch 2010-2025, sheet 2024

A labelled placeholder. No German inventory or German study of a methane-reducing feed additive was read. 0.2 — a fifth of the enteric methane of an animal on the ration — is the order of magnitude the Klimaschutzszenarien assume when they put an additive in half the cattle herd. With entericMitigation at its default of zero it moves nothing in the German reference; it is what a player buys when they move that slider. What would close it: the Thuenen or UBA agricultural mitigation catalogue.

• Oeko-Institut for BMWK, Klimaschutzszenarien 2050 — Sektor Landwirtschaft, p. 22

Digestion avoided 42.5 kt of methane in the inventory year — 15.8 % of the manure methane that would otherwise have been released — with 53 % of the collectable dry matter digested, so the abatement per unit digested is 0.158 / 0.53 = 0.298. Read it with manureMethanised's own why. The equation applies this factor to the whole manure methane at the lever's position, and the base year the per-head factors reproduce is already net of today's digestion, so the German reference at 53 % under-books manure methane by about 1.2 MtCO2e. The correct form is an abatement on the digestion added to the base year; it would change France, so it is recorded as a gap rather than made here.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025)

Zero. German CRT sector 3 carries no HFC line: refrigerant leakage on farms is booked in sector 2.F with the rest of the country's fluorinated gases, not in agriculture the way the French inventory books it. The constant is therefore 0 rather than small, and the base-year livestock check closes without it.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

1 037.2 kt of nitrogen, the inventory's own calendarised mineral-fertiliser figure for 2023. The market data around it disagree in ways worth knowing: the trade association reports 1.095 Mt for 2023/24 and 1.137 Mt for 2024/25 on its own perimeter, and the cooperative federation reports 1.03 Mt of sales in 2023/24. The inventory figure is used because every emission factor beside it is the inventory's implied factor, and mixing a market tonnage with an inventory factor would break the closure.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025)
• IVA, Der Duengemittelmarkt 2024/2025 — 1.137 Mt N in 2024/25, +3.8 % on 1.095 in 2023/24; 67.8 kg N per hectare of farmland.

929.6 kt of nitrogen in manure spread on fields, manure digestates included. It is not every organic input: the inventory books 302.4 kt more from energy-crop digestates, 52.7 from waste digestates and composts, 15.4 from imported manure and 12.1 from sewage sludge, and the module does not itemise them — their nitrous oxide is inside ef_other_crop_n2o, which is calibrated on the whole 2024 soil line. A German reader should know that 383 kt of organic nitrogen is carried in a residual rather than as an input.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025)

131.0 kt of nitrogen deposited by grazing animals. German cattle spend far less of the year outside than French ones: grazing is an eighth of the German excretion against half of the French, which is why the German grazing nitrous oxide is small and the manure-management line large.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025 (Climate Change 40/2025)

149 kt of nitrogen fixed biologically: 9.0 kg a hectare of farmland over 16.57 Mha, from the Thuenen sector model's own nitrogen balance for 2020/22. It is not an inventory source — the German inventory does not publish biological fixation as an input the way Eurostat's gross nutrient balance does for France — so the figure is a model output rather than a measurement, and it is a seventh of what the French balance reports per hectare.

• Thuenen Report 117, Thuenen-Baseline 2024-2034, Table 3.3 — 9.0 kg N per hectare of farmland from biological fixation, RAUMIS 2020/22.

German structure, a French coefficient. The additional fixation a hectare of legumes brings over the credit's span. No German study of it was read; the French value is carried onto the German legume area and the arithmetic below it is German. It is one of the three coefficients that make the German legume lever weaker evidence than the rest of this block.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, fixation_gain — carried unchanged onto a German area

672 kha in 2024: 285.0 kha of pulses and 387.4 kha of forage legumes. It is 2.4 % of the German farmland against 4 % in France, and it has been rising — 326 and 401 kha in 2026.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten — 2024: pulses 285.0 kha, forage legumes 387.4 kha. 2026: 326 and 401 kha.

German structure, a French coefficient. The mineral nitrogen a larger legume area replaces, over the span below. No German study of the substitution was read, so the French pair is carried and applied to the German area. What would close it: a German rotation study, or the nitrogen chapter of the Thuenen baseline read in detail rather than for its balance table.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, legume_n_credit — carried unchanged

The increase in legume area the credit above was booked over, carried with it from the French package. The two are one coefficient in two parts and have to move together.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, legume_credit_span — carried unchanged

7.43 % of the German arable area is organic: 866 249 ha of 11 656 400. The figure usually quoted is 11.3 %, which is organic arable plus organic grassland over arable plus grassland — organic farming in Germany is over-represented on grassland, 994 042 ha of it. This module's lever is on arable land, so the arable share is what it starts from.

• Destatis, Oekologischer Landbau — Ackerland und Dauergruenland — 2026: 1 860 291 ha in all, arable 866 249, grassland 994 042.

German structure, a French coefficient. An organic hectare yields 65 % of a conventional one. No German meta-analysis was read; the value is the French package's, itself the middle of an international range that runs from −19 % to −57 % depending on the crop. It is the coefficient the German arable head room is most sensitive to, because the reference organic share is 30 %.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, organic_yield_ratio — carried unchanged onto German areas

German structure, a French coefficient. The German conventional hectare keeps its yield down to 90 % of its base-year mineral dose, the French package's own stance between INRAE's reading of the cut as efficiency (0.80) and the GRAFS curve with practices unchanged (1.00). No German study splitting a dose cut into efficiency and sufficiency was read. The German reference keeps the base-year dose, so the reference does not move with it; only a player who cuts the dose below 90 % reads it.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, n_yield_plateau — carried unchanged onto German areas

German structure, a French coefficient. The curvature of the yield response below the plateau, taken from the French cropland nitrogen budget. Germany's own mineral share, 0.49, is its own: its fields get more of their nitrogen from manure, so the same cut in mineral nitrogen costs Germany less yield than France.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, crop_nue_base — carried unchanged onto German areas

German structure, a French coefficient. The edible share of the plant-food supply lost downstream of the farm. Germany's own food-waste statistics are good at the whole-chain tonnage and silent on the split by product family, so the French chain synthesis is carried. It drives the plant side of the food-waste lever and nothing else.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, crop_food_waste_share — carried unchanged

The four use shares of the German arable area, fuel and methane crops aside — 9.49 Mha of the 11.66 Mha the land account holds. They are built from the crop areas themselves rather than from a grain balance: cereals for milling and the food potatoes, vegetables and sugar beet that go to people are 1.51 Mha, which is 15.95 % of the non-energy arable area. Germany's arable land is much more feed-oriented than France's — 61 % against 40 % — because half the German cereal crop and almost all its silage maize go to a pig, a chicken or a cow.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024 — The four shares are a reading of the crop areas; the split between the food and feed destinations of the cereal crop is the note's, not a published balance, and is recorded as such in NOTES.md.

Feed: silage maize for the herd, feed cereals, feed potatoes and beet, and the temporary grassland inside the arable class. 61 % of the German non-energy arable area, and the reason a German herd cut frees far more land than a French one.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024

Export crops. Germany exports wheat and rapeseed and imports maize and soya, so the net position is much smaller than France's 23 % — the crop self-sufficiency this block reports is a little above one rather than near a half again.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024

Fallow, seed, set-aside and everything else. It carries the rounding of the other three, which is why arable_share_check is exactly zero and this share is the one to distrust.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024

The forage part of the feed area — silage maize and temporary grassland — which follows the cattle herd alone; the rest is grain and follows the compound-feed species mix. Germany's forage share is higher than France's because 2.05 Mha of silage maize is a fifth of the arable area.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024 — silage maize 2 048.7 kha

1.35 Mha of arable land grew a main crop for a digester in 2024: silage maize 896 kha, grass silage 285, cereal silage 76, grain 78, sugar beet 29 and Silphie 10. It is the value energyMaizeArea is read at where the module is switched off and the area the base-year biogas balance is built on.

• FNR, Statistikbericht 2024, Tables 1 and 2 — 1.37 Mha in 2023, 1.35 Mha estimated for 2024.

15.2 tonnes of dry matter a hectare: the inventory's own biogas energy-crop input, 20.9 Mt of dry matter in 2023, over the feedstock area the same year. Taking the tonnage and the area from the same pair of statistics is what makes the biogas balance close on a measurement rather than on an agronomic yield table.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 236 — 20.9 Mt DM and 305 kt N of biogas energy-crop input in 2023.

1.54 MtCO2e over 1.35 Mha. CRT line 3.J — digestion of energy crops — books 1.445 Mt of methane and 0.093 Mt of nitrous oxide in 2024, from a line that did not exist in 1990. Booking it on the area rather than on the gas is what makes it move with the lever a player has; the alternative, a fixed constant, would have left 1.5 MtCO2e answering to nothing.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

German structure, a reading rather than a statistic. The species split of German compound feed was not read from a primary source; the three shares are set from the herd's own feed demand — pigs dominate German compound feed, poultry is second and cattle third, which is the reverse of the French order. They are the weights of the feed-grain index and nothing else. What would close it: the DRV or BVA compound-feed production statistics by species.

• countries/DE/NOTES.md — the compound-feed species split is a reading, not a fetched statistic

Cattle's share of German compound feed, on the same reading.

• countries/DE/NOTES.md — the compound-feed species split is a reading, not a fetched statistic

Pigs' share of German compound feed, on the same reading. Germany feeds 21 million pigs, three times the French herd, and the compound-feed industry is built around them.

• countries/DE/NOTES.md — the compound-feed species split is a reading, not a fetched statistic

2.53 tCO2e a tonne of mineral nitrogen: 9.9 kt of nitrous oxide over 1 037.2 kt of nitrogen. The implied direct emission factor is 0.61 % against the IPCC default of 1 %, because Germany uses the regionalised factors of Mathivanan et al. (2021) rather than the Tier 1 default. The indirect nitrous oxide — 0.87 tCO2e a tonne of any nitrogen input — is not here: it is in ef_other_crop_n2o, which the module applies to the whole input.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 293 — N2O by source, 2023 — kt N2O: mineral 9.9, manure 9.7, other organic 3.8, grazing 1.1, residues 8.2, mineralisation 1.2, organic soils 12.3, indirect deposition 6.6 and leaching 4.3; total 57.2.

0.318 tCO2 a tonne of mineral nitrogen: the urea line, 0.33 MtCO2 in 2024, over the nitrogen delivered. It is urea and nothing else. German liming is 1.91 MtCO2 and is driven by area and soil pH rather than by nitrogen, so it is declared in crop_carbon_fixed instead — which is why this factor is a quarter of the French one, where the two are charged together.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

German liming, taken out of the nitrogen dose. 1.91 MtCO2 of liming (CRT 3.G) plus 0.15 of other carbon-containing fertilisers (3.I), held constant. Liming follows soil pH and the area limed, not the nitrogen delivered, so charging it on nitrogen the way the French package does would have let a German nitrogen cut switch off two megatonnes of limestone. It is 2.6 % of the German agriculture sector and it answers to no lever, which is stated rather than hidden.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

2.77 tCO2e a tonne of nitrogen in spread manure: 9.7 kt of nitrous oxide over 929.6 kt of nitrogen. Above the mineral factor, which is the opposite of the usual ordering and follows from Germany's regionalised mineral factors.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 293

2.23 tCO2e a tonne of nitrogen deposited at pasture: 1.1 kt of nitrous oxide over 131.0 kt. The inventory applies the IPCC 2019 wet-climate factor of 0.6 % to cattle.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 293

The calibrated factor of the German crop block, and the one to watch. It carries, per tonne of the nitrogen input the module counts, everything the three factors above do not: crop residues (8.2 kt of nitrous oxide), mineralisation (1.2), the organic inputs the module does not itemise (3.8), and all the indirect deposition and leaching (10.9). It is fitted so that the base-year soil line reproduces the 2024 category total less the peat nitrous oxide — 11.20 MtCO2e — and it lands at 2.545, within a per cent of the 2.842 the 2023 sources imply on their own. The gap between the two is a year: the nitrogen inputs the module declares are the 2023 inventory's, because the 2024 detail is not published, and the target is the 2024 line. Watch this number after any change to the German nitrogen inputs.

• UBA, National Inventory Report Germany 2025, Table 293, against the 2024 trend-table line 3.D of 14.47 MtCO2e
• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

Zero. CRT 3.F — field burning of agricultural residues — is reported as not occurring in Germany: burning straw on the field has been prohibited since the 1990s.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

7.5 MtCO2e from farm and forestry engines and farm boilers, CRT 1.A.4.c, which the Klimaschutzgesetz counts inside the agriculture sector: 53.31 of sector 3 plus 7.5 is the 60.8 the KSG books. As in France it is a process term rather than energy times a factor, and the energy behind it is reported as farm_fuel_energy_2024 and is outside the carrier pools in both directions.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

Negative, which France's is not, and the sign is the point. The land account's grassland class is 6.134544 Mha — the land survey's agricultural area less arable land and permanent crops — while the farm survey's Dauergruenland is 4.714 Mha. The 1.42 Mha between them is non-farm grassland, paddocks, airfield margins and small parcels the land survey calls agricultural and the farm survey does not. The livestock block must graze the farm survey's grassland, so this constant subtracts the difference instead of adding rough grazing to it. France's +1.39 Mha runs the other way, because the French farm survey counts rough grazing the land survey books as heath. Both are the same reconciliation with opposite signs, and a country package may declare either.

• Destatis, Landwirtschaftliche Bodennutzung nach Hauptnutzungsarten, 2024 — Landwirtschaftlich genutzte Flaeche 16 568.9 kha, of which Ackerland 11 656.4, Dauergruenland 4 714.3 and Dauerkulturen 198.2.
• Destatis, Flaechenerhebung 2023 (33111) — ALKIS Landwirtschaft 17 989 145 ha

The ammonia German chemistry makes for something other than German fields: 2 950 kt of output less the 631 kt that the fertiliser nitrogen at a 50 % domestic share implies. It is large — four fifths of the output — because Germany exports fertiliser and because caprolactam, technical nitrates and the urea that goes into diesel exhaust fluid are all made here. It is derived from a placeholder: the 50 % domestic share above it is not sourced, so this residual carries that uncertainty one for one. A reviewer should read the two together.

• Agora Industrie, Standorte, Produktion und Kapazitaeten der Ammoniaksynthese in Deutschland, Abbildung 12 — About 2 950 kt of ammonia in 2020, at SKW Piesteritz, BASF Ludwigshafen, INEOS Koeln and Yara Brunsbuettel. Read as an image, not as a table.

A labelled placeholder, and the same one the ammoniaDomesticShare lever carries: the share of German mineral nitrogen made in Germany is not published in the sources this port read. What would close it: the Destatis production statistics for GP 20151030 against the IVA import shares by nutrient.

• IVA, Der Duengemittelmarkt 2024/2025 — heavy import reliance since 2022, no tonnage split

CRT 3.A enteric fermentation 25.85 plus 3.B manure management 9.07 (methane 6.23 and nitrous oxide 2.84), 2024. Livestock is 65 % of the German agriculture sector, enteric fermentation is 77 % of its methane and cattle are 93 % of that.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

CRT 3.D agricultural soils 14.47 plus 3.G liming 1.91 plus 3.H urea 0.33 plus 3.I other carbon-containing fertilisers 0.15 plus 3.J digestion of energy crops 1.54, 2024. The last of the five is a German line France has no equivalent of, and 3.26 MtCO2e of the first is the nitrous oxide of drained organic soil, which this module drives from the peat lever rather than from the nitrogen dose.

• UBA, Nationale Trendtabellen 1990-2024, sheet GHG_CO2eq, and Emissionsuebersichten KSG-Sektoren

Methane yield of the wet feedstocks a digester takes — manure, crop residues and grass alike, which is how the source publishes it, as one number rather than three. Cover crops get their own, higher figure (cive_biogas_yield), because a whole green plant digests better than straw or a slurry does. It is shared rather than national because it is a property of the substrate, not of the country: the same tonne of dry manure yields the same methane in Germany. What is national is how many tonnes there are, which is manure_dm_per_cattle_head and its neighbours.

• IGEDD/CGE/CGAAER, Évaluation du potentiel de production d'énergies renouvelables à partir de la biomasse, déc. 2023, annexe 10 p. 134 — 2,0 MWh PCI/t MS pour effluents, résidus et herbe

A winter intermediate crop harvested whole gives 250–320 Nm³ of methane a tonne of dry matter, and a normal cubic metre of methane is 9.97 kWh PCI, so the range is 2.5–3.2 MWh/t DM. 2.8 is its middle, and it is the figure that makes the mission's own arithmetic work: 6 t DM/ha × 2.8 is 17 TWh per million hectares, which is what the report quotes.

• IGEDD 2023, p. 22–23 et annexe 10 — 250–320 Nm³ CH₄/t MS, 17 TWh/Mha de CIVE
• AILE, Les substrats en méthanisation — pouvoirs méthanogènes par substrat

A tonne of dry residue turned into a second-generation liquid fuel by the thermochemical route yields the same 2.0 MWh as the same tonne turned into biogas, which is exactly why the two compete: choosing one forecloses the other at no gain in energy. Declared separately from the biogas figure so that a source which does separate them can move one without the other. The equality is not a coincidence of rounding — Fischer-Tropsch converts at up to 50% and a digester's methane at a similar order — but it is a coarse number, and the route's real efficiency depends on the plant.

• IGEDD 2023, annexe 10 — 2,0 MWh/t MS en voie thermochimique ; Fischer-Tropsch ≤ 50 %, FAME ≤ 70 %

Two administrations publish two numbers and the game has to pick one. The energy directorate's biomass balance uses 2.14 MWh per cubic metre of roundwood; the environment inspectorate's annex uses 2.4. 2.14 is taken because it is the figure the balance that also supplies non_forest_wood and waste_wood is written on, and mixing two conventions inside one total would be worse than choosing the lower of them. The difference is 12%, or about fourteen terawatt-hours on the base year — larger than any single lever in this block moves. It is shared rather than national because it is a conversion, not a measurement of a country: what varies across borders is the species mix behind it, and a country that knows its own should say so in the why of the entries that use it.

• SGPE, Bouclage biomasse : enjeux et orientations, juillet 2024, p. 19 — 2,14 MWh/m³
• IGEDD 2023, annexe 7 — 2,4 MWh PCI/m³, la valeur non retenue

1.29 tonnes of collectable dry matter a head of cattle a year: 14.15 Mt of technically available cattle slurry and solid manure over the 11.0 million cattle of the survey year. Technically available is the biomass monitor's own perimeter — what could be collected from housing, not what the animal excretes — which is why it is twice the French figure: German cattle spend far less of the year at pasture, so far more of the manure is collectable.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

0.045 tonnes a pig a year: 1.18 Mt of pig slurry and solid manure over 26 million pigs. Pigs are 6 % of the collectable dry matter and a third of the animals.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

On the dry-matter basis, because that is what the biogas equation reads. 8.1 of the 15.3 Mt of technically collectable manure dry matter already goes to a digester. Two other fractions of the same practice are published and neither belongs here: the inventory reports 18.8 % of the manure nitrogen digested, and the sector association says about a third by fresh mass. The three measure the same fleet on three denominators, and mixing them would break the base-year biogas balance.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

Not verified. Five tonnes of dry matter a hectare of catch crop, the middle of the 4 to 6 the German farm-management institute quotes; the source was reached at search level only. It multiplies 53 kha, so it is worth 0.74 TWh of the German biogas supply and the uncertainty is small in absolute terms — but a player who pushes civeArea to its maximum is multiplying it by twenty.

• KTBL cover-crop dry-matter yields, quoted at search level — 4 to 6 t DM/ha — The primary was not opened. Recorded as not verified in NOTES.md.

53 kha of cover crop cut for a digester in 2022/23 — 39.9 kha of winter and 13.4 kha of summer catch crops — out of 2.15 Mha of cover crops grown in Germany. The feedstock association's own 285 kha of grass silage including cover crops is a wider category and is inside energy_maize_area_base instead, so the two do not overlap.

• Destatis, Zwischenfruechte — Anbau auf dem Ackerland, 2022/23

About 4 Mha of spring crops — silage and grain maize, sugar beet, potatoes and spring cereals — could carry a winter cover crop before it. Derived from the crop areas rather than published as a ceiling, so it is a reported diagnostic and never a constraint.

• Destatis, Ackerland nach Hauptfruchtgruppen und Fruchtarten, 2024

0.83 tonnes of dry matter a hectare of arable land: 9.66 Mt of technically available cereal straw over the land account's own 11.656 Mha of arable land. The perimeter is not France's. The French constant, 3.30 t/ha, is everything the field produces; this one is what could be carried away once what the soil needs is left on it. Comparing the two directly is a mistake, and the mobilisation lever's maximum is stated on this narrower pool accordingly.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

Half a per cent. Of the 9.66 Mt of technically available straw, 5.23 Mt is already used and 5.18 Mt of that is bedding; 0.05 Mt goes to energy. German straw is a bedding and a soil input, not a fuel.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

Half the mobilised straw to a digester and half to a second-generation liquid plant, as in the French package. Neither route exists at scale in Germany today — the base mobilisation is half a per cent — so the split is a teaching rule and is declared as one. What matters more than the value is that the split is exhaustive: this share and its complement are the only claims on the mobilised pool, so a tonne of straw is methane or a liquid and never both.

• countries/FR/FR.yaml, residue_to_biogas_share — the same rule, and the same reason

The residual, and it is 17.6 % of the German base year against 78 % of the French one. What the module cannot build from an area or a herd: sewage gas (3.8 TWh), landfill gas (0.2), and the biowaste and industrial digestion that make up the rest. It is fitted so the base-year balance closes, exactly as France's is, and the reason it is a sixth rather than three quarters is that Germany publishes its digester feedstock as hectares and tonnes of dry matter while France publishes a number of plants. It moves with no lever, because it is what the module does not model.

• BMWK / AGEE-Stat, Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland 1990-2024, sheets 3, 5 and 6
• Fachverband Biogas, Branchenzahlenreport 2025

The share of the material harvest that comes back as sawmill offcuts, bark, panel residues and black liquor. It is the one fitted term in the German wood balance — the harvest, the material share, the unutilised share, the conversion factor and the two waste terms are all measured — so what the base-year check measures is how much those five miss the observed total by once this one has done its work. It lands at 0.591, within two points of the French 0.581 on a completely different forest, which is a weak but real cross-check. The German by-products the biomass monitor counts — 8.91 Mt of sawmill by-products, 1.78 of black liquor — imply a lower share on a narrower definition of energetic use, and the difference is what the fit absorbs.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)
• Eurostat nrg_bal_c, gross inland consumption, DE 2023 — Primary solid biofuels 148.77 TWh, biogases 90.21 TWh, liquid biofuels 37.92 TWh.

Wood energy from hedges, orchards, parks and trees outside woodland. The biomass monitor puts the technical landscape-wood potential at 2.08 Mt of dry matter with 0.61 Mt used, which is 3 to 9 TWh depending on the moisture and the conversion assumed; 5 TWh is the middle of that and is declared provisional. France's 22.8 TWh is far larger because the French figure includes the hedgerow firewood that Germany counts inside its informal harvest instead.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

End-of-life wood burned for energy: 6.34 Mt of the 7.48 Mt of waste wood the biomass monitor counts is used energetically, at 4.5 MWh a tonne — 28.5 TWh. It is three times the French figure and is a fifth of the whole German wood supply, which is worth knowing before reading any German wood result: a fifth of it comes out of a demolition skip rather than out of a forest, and no lever in this game moves it.

• DBFZ Resource Database, DE-Biomass Monitor 2010-2020 (CSV v6.3)

15.9 MWh a hectare, from the German crop mix: 583 kha of rapeseed at about 1.5 tonnes of oil a hectare and 10.3 MWh a tonne, plus 231 kha of ethanol crops at about 17 MWh a hectare. The mix is held fixed while the area moves, which is the simplification to name — a sugar-beet hectare yields three times an oilseed one, and the German mix is three quarters oilseed.

• FNR, Statistikbericht 2024, Table 3 — 2023: rapeseed for biodiesel and vegetable oil 583 kha; ethanol crops 231 kha — wheat 113, rye 49, maize 31, sugar beet 11.

814 kha growing a first-generation liquid-fuel crop in 2023. Unlike the cover crops it takes land, so it is inside arable_needed with the energy maize; the two together are 2.16 Mha, 19 % of the German arable area.

• FNR, Statistikbericht 2024, Table 3

A labelled placeholder. Used cooking oil and animal fats collected in Germany and made into liquid fuel. Two thirds of the fuel Germany burns is made from wastes and residues, but most of that used cooking oil is imported — the quota report puts 19 % of all feedstock inside Germany — and the table that splits the wastes by origin was not read. 3 TWh is the French value carried across, and it is a plausible German order of magnitude for domestic collection rather than a German measurement. What would close it: Table 25 of the BLE evaluation report, wastes by country of origin.

• BLE, Evaluations- und Erfahrungsbericht 2024 — feedstock origin — Two thirds wastes and residues; 19 % of the feedstock from Germany; the by-origin table was not read.
• countries/FR/FR.yaml, waste_fats_supply — the 3 TWh is carried from there

The net import that closes the base-year liquid balance: 31.865 TWh consumed less 12.93 from German crops, 3.0 from German bins and 0.05 from straw. The base-year check therefore closes by construction on this pool, which is a difference from France, where the liquid check was the one nothing was fitted to. The gross flows are much larger and run both ways — 81 % of the feedstock and two thirds of the fuel come from outside Germany, because German rapeseed biodiesel is exported while imported used cooking oil is burned here — and the module carries the net, because a supply band should score what the country actually has. The gross reading would put the import at about 26 TWh, and the difference between the two is the trade asymmetry the module does not model.

• BLE, Evaluations- und Erfahrungsbericht 2024 — 19 % of the feedstock from Germany, 34 % of the fuel produced in Germany, 70 % in the EU.
• BMWK / AGEE-Stat, Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland 1990-2024, sheets 3, 5 and 6

148.77 TWh of primary solid biofuels, gross inland consumption, 2023 — and the year is not 2024. The German final-energy series for 2024 is published and the primary one is not: AGEE-Stat reports 120.75 TWh of heat and 10.10 TWh of electricity from solid biomass in 2024, which are final figures on two different conversion chains and cannot be added into a primary total without inventing two efficiencies. The European energy balance publishes the primary figure directly, for 2023. The constant states the year rather than hiding it, and the wood balance is checked on it.

• Eurostat nrg_bal_c, gross inland consumption, DE 2023 — Primary solid biofuels 148.77 TWh, biogases 90.21 TWh, liquid biofuels 37.92 TWh.
• BMWK / AGEE-Stat, Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland 1990-2024, sheets 3, 5 and 6

89.3 TWh of raw biogas in 2024, built from the German sector figures: 29 TWh of electricity from on-site combined heat and power at 40 % electrical efficiency is 72.5 TWh of gas, plus 12.8 TWh of biomethane fed to the grid, plus 3.8 of sewage gas and 0.2 of landfill gas. The 40 % is the convention to name; it is consistent with the 32.3 TWh of gross heat the same fleet sells and gives it away. It lands within one per cent of the European balance's 90.21 TWh of biogases for 2023, which is an independent cross-check on the construction.

• Fachverband Biogas, Branchenzahlenreport 2025
• BMWK / AGEE-Stat, Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland 1990-2024, sheets 3, 5 and 6
• Eurostat nrg_bal_c, gross inland consumption, DE 2023 — Primary solid biofuels 148.77 TWh, biogases 90.21 TWh, liquid biofuels 37.92 TWh.

31.87 TWh of liquid biofuel in 2024: biodiesel and hydrotreated oil 20.359, ethanol 9.245, vegetable oil 0.031 in transport, plus 2.129 of heat and 0.101 of electricity. Biomethane in transport (3.1 TWh) is not here — it is a gas and is counted in the biogas pool, so the two do not double count; the German quota year, which counts them together and on a different calendar, reports 3.6 Mt or about 35 TWh.

• BMWK / AGEE-Stat, Zeitreihen zur Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland 1990-2024, sheets 3, 5 and 6